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ARTICLES

CLASS ACTIONS:
THE CLASS AS PARTY AND CLIENT
David L. Shapiro*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the most dramatic development in civil procedure in recent decades has been the growth of interest in the class action as an
actual and potential means of resolving a wide range of disputes. This
interest, of course, extends far beyond the bounds of civil procedure
itself into the domains of substantive tort and contract law, federalism,
and the proper interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of due
William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard University.
I would like to thank Rachel Brand for her research assistance, and Robert Bone,
Bruce Hay, Susan Koniak, Daniel Meltzer, and David Rosenberg for their generous
and helpful counsel and advice.
I have in recent years been involved in several class action cases, including
unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in two cases,
see In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Grady
v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995), and Kamilewicz v. Bank of
Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir.), rehg denied, 100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996) (7-5
vote), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 1569 (1997), and to persuade the Fifth Circuit that
certification of a class was appropriate in Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734
(5th Cir. 1996).
I hope that my involvement in these cases was not a factor in the unfortunate
(and in my view erroneous) results; my disappointment in the outcome in each has
been somewhat eased by the support for our position in several law review comments.
See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv.
1051, 1270-80 (1996) (discussing Kamilewicz); Case Comment, 109 HFARv. L. REv. 870
(1996) (discussing Rhone-PoulencRorer);Case Comment, 110 Hv. L. REV. 977 (1997)
(discussing Castano).
In any event, I believe that the views here expressed have not been affected by
the particular role I played as an advocate in those cases. These views, however, are
the result not only of my reading, teaching, and general reflection in the field, but
also of what I have learned as a participant in litigation.
*
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process. Indeed, it is partly through the class action device that we
may be witnessing, and taking part in, a sea change in our understanding of both substantive and procedural law.'
Small wonder then, that the significance of the class action, and
its proper bounds, have become the topic du jour for academic and
judicial conferences, for a whole range of law school courses, and for
legal journals.2 Is there a law review out there somewhere-aside per1 Three developments in 1997 were of high public visibility and served to increase the level of interest in the class action technique. The first was the settlement
agreement reached between a group of state attorneys general and the tobacco industry-an agreement that, at this writing, is contingent on congressional approval. This
agreement contains many controversial and important provisions, but for present
purposes, the most significant is the stipulation that in the absence of the defendant's
consent, there may be individual lawsuits arising from the past conduct of one or
more tobacco companies, but no class actions or other aggregation devices. See Stephen Labaton, Limits on Lawsuits and Damage Claims Could Bring Years of Legal Fights,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1997, at A14; Excerpts From Agreement Between States and Tobacco
Industry, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1997, at A18.
Second, the Supreme Court, in June 1997, decided that a class of persons whose
present or potential claims were based on exposure to asbestos products manufactured by a group of defendants could not be certified as a "settlement class" under the
criteria laid down in FED. R. Clv. P. 23. SeeAmchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct.
2231 (1997) (emphasizing that the requisites for certification of a settlement class
were especially stringent and that potential conflicts and other problems in the case
before it constituted a clear bar to certification, and explicitly rejecting the holding of
the court below that a class could never be certified for settlement purposes unless it
met all the requirements for a litigating class under Rule 23).
Finally, in August 1997, a jury in the first phase of a class action suit found that
Dow Chemical Company had knowingly misled the public by concealing information
about the health risks of silicone breast implants. See Barry Meier, Dow Chemical
Deceived Women on Breast Implants, Jury Decides, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1997, at Al.
2 A full bibliography of those publications devoted in whole or substantial part
to the use of class actions in litigation would warrant a sizable appendix. But a listing
of books and articles I have found helpful-some of which are long and detailed,
while others, though short, are incisive and provocative-may serve a dual purpose: to
provide a brief, accessible bibliography for those interested in further research and to
furnish a single, easily consulted source of cross-reference for later citations in this
essay.
With apologies to those important works that have been inadvertently omitted,
the list includes:
JACK

B.

WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUALJUsTICE IN MASS TORT LrrIGATION

(1995);

STEPHEN C.

YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACrION (1987)
[hereinafter YEAZELL, GROUP LITIGATION]; Kenneth S. Abraham, IndividualAction and

Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REv. 845 (1987);
Robert G. Bone, Personaland ImpersonalLitigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REv. 213 (1990) [hereinafter Bone, Litigative Forms];
Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Dayin Court"Idealand Nonparty Preclusion,67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 193 (1992) [hereinafter Bone, Nonparty Preclusion]; Robert G. Bone, Statistical
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Adjudication:Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World ofProcess Scarcity, 46 VAN,. L. REv. 561
(1993) [hereinafter Bone, StatisticalAdjudication];Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The ConstitutionalLimits ofJudicialRulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated UnderFederalRule 23, 39 Aiuz. L. REv. 461 (1997); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343
(1995); Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the RulemakingProcess, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 13 (1996); Roger C. Cramton, IndividualizedJustice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement
ClassActions" An Introduction, 80 Comm. L. REv. 811 (1995); Kenneth W. Dam, Class
Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 47
(1975); Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidationof Complex Litigation: A CriticalEvaluation
oftheALProposa 10J.L. & CoM. 1 (1990); Eric D. Green, Advancing IndividualRights
Through GroupJustice, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791 (1997); Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settlefor Too Little, 48 HAsTrmcs L.J. 479 (1997); Geoffrey
B. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 299
(1972); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 (1997);
Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in
ClassActions InvolvingExclusiveFederal Claims,1996 Sup. CT. REv. 219; Harry Kalven,Jr.
& Maurice Rosenfield, The ContemporaryFunction of the Class Suit, 8 U. CH. L. REV. 684
(1941); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Prods.,
Inc., 80 CoRNELu.L L. REV. 1045 (1995); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under
Cloak of Settlement 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex
Litigation,71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996); John Leubsdorf, Co-opting the Class Action, 80
CoRNEL L. REv. 1222 (1995);Jonathan R- Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs
Attorney's Role in Class Action andDerivativeLitigation:EconomicAnalysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CH. L. REV. 1 (1991); Richard L. Marcus, They Can'tDo That,
Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CoRNELL L. REV. 858 (1995); Francis E. McGovem, An Analysis of Mass TortsforJudges, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1821 (1995); CarrieJ. MenkelMeadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159 (1995); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining
Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "ClassAction Problem, "92 HAv.L. REV. 664 (1979); Linda
S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A ProposedFederal Procedure Act, 64
TEX. L. REv. 1039 (1986) [hereinafter Mullenix, The Mass-Tort Case]; Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionalityof the ProposedRule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 Aiuz. L.
REV. 615 (1997) [hereinafter Mullenix, Constitutionality];Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort
as PublicLaw Litigation:ParadigmMisplaced,88 Nw. U. L. REv. 579 (1994) [hereinafter
Mullenix, ParadigmMisplaced]; George L. Priest, Proceduralversus Substantive Controls of
Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STuD. 521 (1997); Robert L. Rabin, Continuing
Tensions in the Resolution of Mass Toxic Harm Cases:A Comment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1037
(1995); Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Tria: The Burden of Mass Toxics Litigation, 98
YALE LJ.813 (1989) [hereinafter Rabin, Tort System]; Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, andDismay, 80 CoRNELL L. REV. 918 (1995); Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991) [hereinafter Resnik, From "Cases to
"Litigation'];Judith Resnik, Litigatingand Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisitesof Entry,
30 U.C. DAVIS L. Rrv. 835 (1997) [hereinafter Resnik, Litigatingand Settling]; Deborah
L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982); David Rosenberg, Class Actionsfor Mass Torts: DoingIndividualJusticeby Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J.
561 (1987); [hereinafter Rosenberg, Class Actions]; David Rosenberg, IndividualJustice
and CollectivizingRisk-Based Claims in Mass Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 210 (1996)
[hereinafter Rosenberg, IndividualJustice]; David Rosenberg, OfEnd Games and Open-
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haps from such esoteric publications as the JAG Journal-that has
managed to keep its pages unsullied by the controversies that the class
action device has generated?
Always in the foreground of any discussion of the class action, or
at least well within view, is the continuing debate between the advocates of individual autonomy in litigation and the proponents of what
has been praised as "collective" justice.3 And as always in such debates, there are those who strive for accommodation, or who describe
the debate as presenting a false dichotomy-on the ground, for example, that aggregation of claims through such devices as the class action
is in truth the wisest and most efficient way of promoting individual
4
justice.
ings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessonsfrom a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695 (1989) [hereinafter Rosenberg, End Games]; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond the Class Action Rule: An
Inventory of Statutory Possibilitiesto Improve the FederalClass Action, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 186
(1996); George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement
Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258 (1996); Michael J. Saks & Peter David
Blanck, JusticeImproved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial
of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992); Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional
Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 941 (1995); William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Orderout of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837 (1995);John
A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 990 (1995); Roger
H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 69;
Thomas E. Willging, et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking
Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74 (1996); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 439
(1996); Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts-Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1228
(1995); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in
Collective Litigation, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 687 (1997) [hereinafter Yeazell, Defendant Classes];
Patricia Anne Solomon, Note, Are Mandatory Class Actions Unconstitutional, 72 NoRE
DAME L. REV. 1627 (1997).
3 In the works cited supra note 2, writings of those who lean toward the former
(individual autonomy) side of the debate include Epstein, Solomon, and Trangsrud.
See also Abraham, supra note 2, at 847 ("[T]he move toward collective [as opposed to
individual] responsibility in tort law is not, on the whole, a sensible development.").
Among the writings cited supra note 2 that look more to a "collective" approach are
those of Bone, Hay, Macey & Miller, Rosenberg, and Weinstein.
4 Of the works cited, several of those I would put in the "collective" camp portray
the use of techniques of collectivization as the best means of promoting individual
justice. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 2; Rosenberg, supra note 2. In addition, a
number of the works cited supra note 2, including those of Coffee, Cooper, Marcus,
McGovern, and Resnik, recognize the changes that are occurring, evaluate the defects
and virtues of those changes, and make recommendations for safeguarding both individual and group interests.
For reasons explained below, I agree with the idea that individuals are often better served by a collective approach to the treatment of class actions. But the two
approaches I have described are necessarily in some tension, especially if one accepts
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It is not easy to wade into this debate in mid-stream, especially if
one wants to do more than to summarize positions already staked out.
But in my contribution to this Issue, I have been moved to take the
plunge (to pursue the watery metaphor for the last time), in part to
try to work through the controversy for myself-a revered mentor
once told me that he never was sure of what he thought until he had
heard himself speak-and in part because of my own special concerns
for the institutional aspects of such problems. 5 It is these latter concerns that have, in my view, been slighted (though certainly not wholly
neglected) in the debate.
To be more concrete, the principal focus of the debate, both in
the courts and in more academic forums, has been the extent to
which the class action (or other roughly comparable joinder devices)
should be viewed as not involving the claimants as a number of individuals, or even as an "aggregation" of individuals, but rather as an
entity in itself for the critical purposes of determining the nature of
the lawsuit, the role of the lawyer and the judge, and the significance
of the disposition. 6 But if-as I have concluded and will try to convince you in the pages that follow-the "class as entity ' forces should
ultimately carry the day, substantial institutional problems remain
when it comes to implementation. These problems, which are also
addressed here, include issues of federalism, the proper mix of rules
and standards, and the allocation of functions between the legislative
and judicial branches.
My goal in this essay, then, falls into two parts. First, I will address
the question of the class action in modern litigation and its relation to
our strong traditions of individualism and autonomy. The second
part of the essay builds on the conclusion of the first: that the notion
the view that a significant value of a procedural system is the "dignitary" function of
facilitating individual participation in the process even when unfettered participation
may run counter to the interests (and majority wishes) of a group of which the individual is a member, or may consume significant public resources. For a discussion of

such dignitary values, see Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court'sDue Process Calculusfor
AdministrativeAdjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 49-54, 57 (1976). But cf.Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Don't Try: CivilJury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1,

57-59 (1997) (discussing, inter alia,the absence of empirical evidence supporting the
value of dignitary participation).
5 See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism,74 VA. L. REv.
519, 551-72 (1988).
6 The idea of an "entity" approach was perhaps most lucidly suggested in a

thoughtful and provocative discussion by Edward Cooper. See Cooper, supranote 2, at
26-32. The ramifications of the entity model are developed infra text accompanying
notes 53-80.
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of the class as entity should prevail over more individually oriented
notions of aggregate litigation. The institutional questions raised by
such a conclusion, as suggested above, include: (a) the proper role of
national law in working through these implications; (b) the proper
mix of rules and standards in laying down the course to be followed by
litigants, lawyers, and judges; and (c) the proper allocation of responsibility between the branches of government (whether at the state or
the national level) for charting that course. This second part, I hope,
will bring down to the level of worldly problems the often abstract,
and even abstruse, discussions among scholars both about federalism
and about the nature of law and lawmaking.
This is an ambitious undertaking, and if fully explored and developed, would comfortably fill the covers of a good-sized book. But my
project is more modest, in that my goal is to suggest rather than to
resolve, and to stimulate others to criticize or defend, and even more
optimistically, expand on some of these ideas.
II.

THE CLAss As ENTI=Y OR AS AGGREGATION

A.

Two Models of the Class Action

In the interest of oversimplification, take two models of "group
litigation." 7 The first-what might be called the aggregation modelsees the various joinder devices, including the class action, as essentially techniques for allowing individuals to achieve the benefits of
pooling resources against a common adversary. Under this view, the
individual who is part of the aggregate surrenders as little autonomy
as possible (although some sacrifices are undoubtedly inevitable if the
group effort is to have any utility and to afford any economies of
scale). Thus the individual retains his own counsel, retains the right
to leave the group before, during, and after the litigation, and can
insist on playing a significant role in the operations of the group so
long as he chooses to remain a part of that group.
7 The comparisons drawn here, and to some extent the views expressed, are
analogous to those of Abram Chayes in his pathbreaking article, The Role of theJudge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). But there are some differences
(aside from the obvious). Perhaps most important, Chayes focused on what was properly viewed as "public" litigation-litigation that characteristically involved attempts to
reconstitute, or even reconceive, the mission of public institutions of many kinds.
The litigation I deal with here is, for the most part, essentially "private" in that it
generally involves traditional claims of tort and contract against private defendants.
The difference from the traditional private dispute is that the cases studied here involve the claims that one or more private wrongdoers have caused injury to a large
number of individuals by a single act or a related series of acts.
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The second, in a phrase borrowed from Professor Cooper, 8 I call
the "entity" model. In this view, which is dearly more appropriate in
the class action context than in the context of such otherjoinder devices as consolidation or even massive intervention, the entity is the
litigant and the client. Moreover, in the situations in which class action treatment is warranted, the individual who is a member of the
class, for whatever purpose, is and must remain a member of that
class, and as a result must tie his fortunes to those of the group with
respect to the litigation, its progress, and its outcome. Of course, even
this entity model does not deny the class member the opportunity to
seek private advice, or to contribute in some way to the progress of the
litigation, but it severely limits such aspects of individual autonomy as
the range of choice to move in or out of the class or to be represented
before the court by counsel entirely of one's own selection.
Neither of these models may exist in its unadulterated form in
the real world of litigation at the present time, nor may they ever exist
in such form. But they help to pose the conflict that in my view is
both immanent and imminent-a conflict that has already engaged
the energies of courts and commentators at least since the
reemergence of the class action in the 1960s. 9
B.

The Focus of Discussion

In working through the relative virtues of these models, I have
chosen to limit my analysis in several ways. First, in an effort to focus
on those disputes that are occurring in the world, and on the procedural device that puts the conflict in its starkest form, this essay concentrates on the plaintiff class action. As Stephen Yeazell has shown
in his informative history of the class action, defendant classes with a
pre-existing coherence were often litigants in the early stages of class
action development, 10 but today defendant class actions are rare and
pose special problems of representation and due process that are beyond the scope of this paper." Plaintiff class actions, on the other
8 See Cooper, supra note 2, at 26.
9 Yeazell, Defendant Classes, supra note 2, at 694, notes the dormancy of the class
action as a litigating device from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century.
10 YEAZELL, GROUP LITIGATION, supra note 2, ch. 2; see also Yeazell, Defendant

Classes, supra note 2, at 687-90.
11 While I do not have precise statistics, anyone reasonably familiar with the case
law of class actions would, I think, agree that plaintiff class actions far outnumber
defendant class actions.
Indeed, there is a question whether Rule 23(b) (2) even applies to defendant
class actions. See CHARLES A. WRicHT,

LAW

OF

FEDERAL COURTS §

72, at 515 (5th ed.

1994). And defendant class actions also present more difficult problems both of ade-
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hand, are the center of current interest across a broad range of litigation, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s with institutional and other

civil lights actions, and moving into the late 1980s and 1990s with
claims of civil wrong brought primarily (but not exclusively) against
private defendants.
Second, my primary attention within the domain of plaintiff class
actions will be devoted to the "mass tort" because, once again, this has
been the principal area of current debate. The notion of a mass tort,
however, is broadly defined to embrace any civil wrong (other than a
breach of contract 12) to a significant number of people-a number
large enough to constitute a class under prevailing standards.' 3 Thus,
included within the scope of a mass tort would be a single incident,
like a plane crash; a cause of action based on allegations of toxic harm
or other product liability with either a short or long latency period,
and with or without a "signature" injury (like asbestosis in the case of
exposure to asbestos); allegedly wrongful conduct that causes a small
injury to a large number (like a conspiracy to fix prices on a relatively
inexpensive product that people buy infrequently); and allegedly
wrongful conduct that causes a very substantial harm to every injured
14
individual.
Even this broad definition is not meant to exclude the possible
applicability of the points developed here outside the sphere of mass
torts. Indeed, given the overlap of tort and contract in many areas,
any such exclusion would surely be artificial. Thus, if the suggestions
here are valid in the context of mass tort, they should also be relevant
in cases sounding in contract-for example, cases in which the sole
quacy of representation-because of the uncertainty that the defendant or defendant's counsel is willing or able to represent a class-and of territorial jurisdiction. On
the latter issue, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985).
12 The distinction between tort and contract is one that is often debated and
sometimes denied. The distinction is especially hard to draw when the alleged tort
arises, as it so often does, in the context of a contractual arrangement and when the
tort claim is combined with a claim of breach of express or implied warranty. In this
essay, I include this important group of cases within the category of mass torts.
13 On the question of numerosity, and its relation to context, see WRIGHT, supra

note 11, § 72, at 510.
14 The discussion in this essay assumes that the civil tort system will continue to
play a major role (whether because of inertia or more justifiable grounds of social
policy) in achieving the goals of deterrence and compensation. Other possibilities
have been discussed and advocated. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.
Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997) (suggesting that the fairest and most efficient means of compensation may be a "nationwide administrative claims processing regime"); Abraham,
supra note 2, at 898-906 (discussing virtues and defects of expanded insurance programs); Rabin, Tort System, supra note 2, at 829 (suggesting move toward a "focused,
no-fault" insurance system).
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theory underlying the claim is that the defendant broke a binding
promise to confer a financial benefit on a large group of people.
C. PreliminaryNotes on the Implications of the Second Model
As even the casual reader has probably already gleaned, my conclusion is that of the two models outlined above, the second (of the
class as entity) is the more appropriate in the class action setting.' 5
This brief section elaborates a bit on the conclusion and what it
means, and the following sections attempt to defend it and to explore
some of its most significant ramifications for the nature of the class
action suit.
1. This conclusion is not quite so radical as it may seem at first,
since the idea of the collectivity as an entity is a familiar one in other
settings. Thus, a whole range of voluntary private associations-congregations, trade unions, joint stock companies, corporations-and
on a less "voluntary" level, municipalities and other governmental entites, have long been recognized as litigants in their own right-entities whose members may have at best only a limited say in what is
litigated, in who represents the organization, and on what terms the
controversy is ultimately resolved. Indeed, the rise of those organizations has been noted as one of the reasons for the decline of the class
6
action from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century.'
The analogy is not perfect, of course. Shareholders in a corporation, for example, have chosen to become a part of the corporation for
a variety of reasons-to tie their fate (to the extent of their investment) to that of the business entity in which they have invested, and
they retain the ability to sell their stock at any time, thus settling for
their losses (or gains) to the date of sale. A member of a class that
exists only for the purposes of a litigation may be dragged kicking and
screaming into a lawsuit he does not want, or at least would prefer to
conduct on his own.
But some of these entities are not so "voluntary" after all. The
trade union is an organization that may be an employee's representative in both collective bargaining and litigation because a majority of
fellow workers (of which the individual was not one) selected the
union as its bargaining representative, and the only fully effective way
15 Even if this view is accepted, the difficult question remains whether, at least in
some circumstances, it is wiser to regard a class action as coming closer to the aggregation model. For reasons elaborated below, see infra text accompanying notes
116-35, I believe Rule 23 should be revised to make it adaptable to both models.
16 SeeYEAZELL, GROUP LrTIGATION, supra note 2, at 194-95, 210-12; Bone, Litigative Forms, supra note 2, at 223.

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 73:4

of "withdrawing" may be the unpalatable one of leaving the job. 17
Similarly, to escape the consequences of being part of a municipality
for certain purposes, one cannot simply sell one's stock; the dissatisfied individual's only option (if he fails to persuade his fellow residents) is to move home and family somewhere else. 8
2. The extent to which the entity model is applicable depends on
the extent to which the controversy is suitable for class treatment.
Thus, assuming the class is of sufficient size, it may well be that only
certain aspects of a dispute-perhaps only one of a great many (for
example, the time when certain controlling events occurred)-are
suitable for class treatment. 19 Or it may be that virtually every aspect
of the controversy, including not only all questions of liability but of
damage as well, either warrant or demand such treatment. In either
event, the applicability of the entity model will extend only as far as
class treatment requires.
3. Finally, an intermediate level of class treatment may be called
for: the creation of subclasses. 20 For example, if a product defect is
the subject of a claim by a large group of automobile purchasers, the
interests of those who bought only one or two cars may sufficiently
diverge from the interests of "fleet purchasers" to mandate the creation of essentially two classes of plaintiffs. 2' In such cases, the entity
17 Under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a) (5), 159 (1994), a majority of the employees in a designated bargaining unit

may select a bargaining representative who will then represent all the employees in
the unit, including those who voted against representation. (Individual employees do
not surrender all options short of quitting, however. Thus, an employee may, at least
in theory and often in practice, remain at work when his union calls a strike.)
18 I do not mean to suggest that all involuntary groups are socially beneficialonly that a claim of "involuntariness" is not necessarily fatal to the value of treating an
individual as part of a group, both from the standpoint of society and that of the
individual. As Susan Koniak has reminded me in commenting on an earlier draft, a
company town organized and run by one's employer has less to be said in its favor
than a truly public municipality. Just so, when a class is defined primarily by the
adverse party (say in the course of settlement negotiations), the class may be far from
optimal in terms of coherence and truly shared interests and concerns. The topic is a
large one that is only touched on here.
19 On whether class treatment should be available for one aspect of a case if that
aspect does not "predominate" with respect to the controversy as a whole, see infra
text accompanying notes 131-32.
20 On the value of subclasses in ensuring the proper treatment of divergent interests, see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2250-51 (1997). But asJustice
Breyer noted in his partial dissent in that case, subclassing is not costless; it may be
inefficient and may adversely affect the ability of the plaintiff class to negotiate a fair
settlement. See Id. at 2255-56 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21 See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 801 (3d Cir. 1995) (disapproving certification of settlement class and ap-
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approach would relate to each separate subclass, not (at least in the
normal course) to all the subclasses aggregated as one overriding
group.
D.

The Casefor the Entity Model

The conclusion that the entity model is preferable is not an easy
one for a person like me, who believes in the virtues of autonomy and
individual choice. 22 If, as has been forcefully argued, those virtues
include the value to the individual of a personal "day in court"-of
the ability to participate in the fullest sense in the adjudication of a
claim of right-the conclusion becomes an especially difficult one.
The point, however, is far from self-evident: if such participation is not
cost-effective, and would be seen by the vast majority of those similarly
affected (as well as by their adversary) to run counter to their own
objective of a fair and effective outcome, then the argument proceeding from the value of autonomy may be flawed. Nevertheless, the argument has in significant part animated the notions of fair process
that have resulted in such landmark decisions as PhillipsPetroleum Co.
v. Shutts23 on the rights of class members to notice and to opt out of
the class, as well as Martin v. Wilks 24 on the invalidity of binding a
nonparty, non-class member to a class action settlement even if the
nonparty may have had motive and opportunity to take part in the
proceeding. 25 Thus, whatever one concludes about its empirical support or normative strength, the argument is one that needs to be reckoned with.
1. The most helpful starting point may reside in the "small claim"
class action-an action defined here to embrace those cases in which
the claim of any individual class member for harm done is too small to
provide any rational justification to the individual for incurring the
proval of settlement, and noting that "[a]t the very least," there should have been
certified subclasses separating the fleet owners from the individual owners).
22 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 5, at 545-50.

23 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
24 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
25 In that part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (1) (1994),
Congress attempted to overrule certain aspects of Martin v. Wilks by providing that in
the context of ajudgment in an employment discrimination case, a nonparty will be
bound by that judgment if the nonparty received adequate prior notice of the proposed judgment and its consequences and was afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present objections. But to reflect its awareness of the constitutional issues presented
by this provision, Congress included (presumably superfluous) language that nothing
in the subsection shall "authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due process of law required by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (n) (2) (D).
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costs of litigation. As an example of such a case, take a claim on behalf of many purchasers that defendants have engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy to violate the federal antitrust laws. The case would
easily fit the small claims category if, even after damages are trebled,
the amount due any single purchaser would not exceed, say, $100.26

In such cases, I submit-and some others who would certainly
not go beyond this point may well agree 2 7-that the soundest approach is to view the cause of action as essentially a group claim fitting
the characteristics of the second model, with all the consequences that
entails. Assuming that public prosecutors are not to constitute the
sole means of enforcement in these cases, the small claim class action
strikes me as one that serves the purpose not of compensating those
harmed in any significant sense, or of providing them a sense of personal vindication, but rather, and perhaps entirely, the purpose of allowing a private attorney general to contribute to social welfare by
bringing an action whose effect is to internalize to the wrongdoer the
cost of the wrong. The purpose of the action, in other words, is solely
to deter the kind of wrong that causes a small injury to a large number
Oust as the availability to an individual of a private civil action to recover for a substantial injury can serve to deter the wrongful conduct
of those who would cause an equivalent social harm, but in the form
of a large injury to only one victim). Although some actions of this
kind may not be justifiable except as a means of contributing to the
income of lawyers, surely others are fully warranted, and the question
whether the action should be allowed to go forward is quite different
from the question of the nature of the action once it is certified on
28
behalf of a plaintiff class.
26

The hypothetical is derived from the facts of Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417

U.s. 156 (1974).
Of course, some of those injured might prefer that the suit not be brought at all
because they are financially tied in with the defendants or because they believe such
suits ought to fall within the sole province of public prosecutors. But unless this
group is in a majority, they presumably cannot thwart the action, whether they opt out
or not, and they can always register their disapproval either actively (by objecting to
certification) or passively (by not picking up their check if the class prevails).
27 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 6-7; Trangsrud, supra note 2, at 76.
28 On the question whether the action should be certified as a class action at all, I
was distressed by the terms of proposed Rule 23(b) (3) (F) as put forward for comment
by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference in the summer of 1996. See PROPOSED RULES: AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RuLES,
167 F.R.D. 523, 559 (1996) (proposed amendments to Rule 23). This proposal, which
is also discussed below, appeared to be based on the premise that the desirability of a
small claim class action under Rule 23 (b) (3) should depend to a significant extent on
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That it makes eminent sense to view the class as the aggrieved
claimant in such instances (with the implications suggested in the
models already described and more fully developed below) strikes me
as more than a trivial conclusion. It suggests that notions of individual
choice, autonomy, and participation-and their resonance in the constitutional guarantee of due process-are not so rigid that they cannot
yield to practical arguments about the nature of the case, the character of the wrong complained of, and the individual interests at stake,
as well as the countervailing interests and preferences of others. Of
course, the notion that due process, and the values underlying it, are
capable of such interpretation and application is well accepted in our
jurisprudence, even if there is no solid consensus on the appropriate
29
balance in particular instances.
2. I pass over briefly, but not without emphasis, cases covered by
the first two subsections of Federal Rule 23(b), in many (if not most)
of which the class must in essence stand or fall as a unit because of the
truly indivisible interests of the class members (say as holders of a particular class of stock or other certificate in an enterprise30 ) or because
the granting of equitable relief to one or more class members is
bound to affect the group as a whole.3 ' Indeed, the knowledge that
the balance between the stake of each individual class member and the costs of the
litigation. See infra note 127.
This proposal, which at this writing seems headed for the discard pile, was criticized by many commenters. My own criticism was set forth in a letter to Peter McCabe, Secretary of the Committee.
[w] hether a class action is warranted in such a case depends not on the
magnitude of the wrong to any individual... but rather on such issues as the
alternative means of internalizing the costs of the defendant's wrongful activity and the social value of internalizing those costs (that is, the need for
effective deterrence).
Letter from David Shapiro to Peter McCabe, Secretary of the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice 3 (Jan. 9, 1997) (on file with author).
29 The leading modern case articulating the need to strike such a balance in determining the scope and applicability of the procedural due process requirement is
Mathews v. Eldridge,424 U.S. 319 (1976). The decision has not gone without criticism,
especially on the grounds that it pays insufficient attention to non-instrumental process values. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 4.
30 See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
31 In certain cases in which injunctive relief is sought, a class of people will be
affected if the relief is granted, whether the action is brought in form as an individual
action or as a class action. One example is a case in which a pupil in a school system
demands an injunction that requires her to attend a segregated school; the effect of
the injunction, if granted, will necessarily be to alter the structure of the school system. As another example, consider a case in which a professional athlete complains
that a particular employment practice violates the antitrust laws and seeks to enjoin
continuation of the practice. The effect of the injunction will inevitably extend to

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:4

these actions generally involve the group as an entity may well have
led the rulemakers in 1966 to make such classes "mandatory" (not
open to opt-out) and to leave questions of the necessity, scope, and
32
form of notice to the discretion of the certifying court.

3. Remaining for consideration are the cases that, in the view of
most, are the hardest to bring within the second model, and indeed
the rulemakers in 1966 expressed doubt that such cases were appropriate for class action treatment at all. 33 (This category should probably include the cases that, for most class members, involve only small
claims but are sufficiently mixed that a significant number of claims,
even after discounting for the costs of individual litigation, are more
substantial.) Perhaps the most challenging of these cases is one involving a mass tort in which there are a large number of victims, all of
whom have suffered, or are threatened with, substantial injury as a
result of the defendant's conduct and who would be likely (if the class
other athletes within the league. See, e.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 556
F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Rhode, supra note 2, at 1195-97.
It is less clear that the fate of the class is a "unitary" one in some of the cases that
may fall within Rule 23(b) (1) if that subdivision extends to actions for monetary relief
solely on the ground that the defendant's assets may not be sufficient to cover all
claims. Although the question has not been resolved by the Supreme Court, some
lower courts have applied this subdivision in such cases in order to preclude class
members from opting out. See In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996),
vacated sub nom., Flanagan v. Ahearn, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997), judgment reinstated, No.
95-40635, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1114 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 1998); Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997) (remanding to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor,
117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997)). For a vigorous defense of the appropriateness of using Rule
23(b) (1) (B) in such "limited fund" cases, see Opinion Affidavit of David Rosenberg,
Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (Civ. Action No. 2:970102) (filed May 1997).
32 Professor Bone has explored the historical foundation of the idea that certain
kinds of group interests have an "impersonal" quality that is especially appropriate for
group litigation and that affords less basis for concern about issues of individual autonomy and control. See, e.g., Bone, Litigative Forms, supra note 2, at 218, 234-87. Cf
Bone, Nonparty Preclusion,supra note 2, at 288-89 (concluding, on the basis of theory,
"informed by history," that "the extent of an individual's right of participation in litigation should vary with the type of case"). Although my perception of the virtues and
desirability of the entity model may be broader than his, I have found his historical
discussion and thoughtful analysis of the nature of individual and group rights most
helpful in my own thinking.
33 The Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendments said that class actions
would "ordinarily not [be] appropriate" in mass tort cases because of the likelihood
that a significant question of damages, liability, and defenses to liability would affect
different individuals in different ways. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) (advisory
committee's notes on proposed Rule 23).
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action format did not exist) to bring individual actions seeking
redress.
It is important, in considering the soundest approach to the
"class" aspects of such cases, to begin with an assumption about the
nature of the class action. Thus, despite the misgivings of the
rulemakers in 1966, we should assume that some aspects of the class
members' claims have properly been certified for class treatment because of the characteristics of those aspects-characteristics sufficiently shared by all members of the class (or subclass). In some
instances, the aspects may be relatively narrow in proportion to the
case as a whole. For example, was a particular assertion in a proxy
statement sufficiently misleading to bring all other questions of potential liability and damage into play? In others, the aspect may be substantial-the "proximate cause" of an airplane accident, for
example-even though difficult individual questions of damages may
remain. And in still others, the common aspects may extend to all or
most of the case, including individual damages-perhaps most clearly
where such damages are concededly identical for every class member
or may be determined simply through application of a formula based
on the extent of an individual's activities.
Even if we start with this assumption, the argument for the first
model-treating the class action as essentially an aggregation of individual actions for purposes of convenience-is strong. After all, if
each individual claim is substantial, each.potential claimant probably
has both the motive and the wherewithal (given the blessings of the
contingent fee) to bring a separate action, an action in which he
chooses his own counsel, develops his own strategy, decides when and
whether to settle, and does all the other things that constitute the core
of litigation as we know it. Why should that claimant be deprived of
an interest that many view as rooted in due process and some view as
firmly entrenched in natural law? To paraphrase Larry Kramer, writing in a related context, such a claimant should be no worse off in
terms of the range of litigating and related choices open to him than a
victim of a one-on-one automobile accident or any other tortious conduct unless somehow the mass tort is substantively different from the
one-on-one wrongful act. 34 Such a difference is "conceptually possible," he wrote, but "[n]o one has made or developed this argu35
ment... [and] I do not see the ground for it as a matter of policy."
There are responses on several levels that, for me at least, are
ultimately convincing despite my own reluctance to be convinced.
34 Kramer, supra note 2, at 572.
35 Id.
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First, as a predicate to the "substantive" issue that Kramer raises, it is
important to stress the considerations of efficiency that serve in the
aggregate to offer a substantial promise of a better substantive outcome for a class member-and certainly for the average class member-than as a litigant in a series of individual actions. These
efficiencies have been chronicled by others.3 6 They embrace such
economies of scale as (1) the pooling of both resources and information; (2) the reduced counsel costs resulting from having lead counsel
doing the bulk of the work for a large group; and (3) the saving of
resources-as well as the distributional equities-that are bound to
flow from a system that allocates compensation to victims on the basis
of expected average harm, as compared to the vastly greater expense
and "luck of the draw" that play a role in the outcome in each of a
series of individual adjudications.3 7 If we attribute rationality to victims (and put to one side the possibly separate interests of their lawyers), many if not most class members would doubtless see these
efficiencies and distributional equities as critical to their choice of
models, especially if the choice has to be made "behind a veil" of a
substantial degree of ignorance about the outcome of their own indi38
vidual action.
36

See, e.g., Louis KAPLOW, AccuRAcy

IN ADJUDICATION,

forthcoming in THE

NEW

Bone, StatisticalAdjudication, supra
note 2; Rosenberg, Class Actions, supra note 2, at 563-73; Rosenberg, Individualized
Justice, supranote 2, at 236-52; see also Marc S. Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to
Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1158-60 (1996) (summarizing problems of the present
tort system, individual compensation including transaction costs, misallocation of
compensation, a shortage of institutional capacity, and impaired information transmission); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849 (1984) (criticizing the tort system's
"private process" and calling for broad reform); Steven Shavell, The FundamentalDivergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
575, 575 (1997) (developing the thesis that "the amount of litigation is socially inappropriate" because of "fundamental differences between private and social incentives
to use the legal system").
37 Some savings may be achieved in individual litigation through use of the doctrine of nonmutual issue preclusion. In general, however, the erosion of the mutuality doctrine in recent decades has been limited to allowing a nonparty to claim the
benefits of a prior litigation (subject to a number of conditions that are not always easy
to meet), but (in the absence of special circumstances) not to be burdened by the
outcome of a litigation in which he did not participate. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS §§ 27-29, 43-63 (1982). For a powerful presentation of the
historical and theoretical support for broader application of preclusion doctrines
against nonparties-see Bone, Nonparty Preclusion, supra note 2.
38 The quoted phrase is originally that ofJohn Rawls in his noted book, A THEORY
OF JusTICE 136-42 (1971), and has been developed and applied in this context by
David Rosenberg in several articles forcefully advocating the averaging of damages in
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW;
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But the argument for efficiency may justify aggregation without
mandating or even warranting adoption of the entity model. And the
efficiency arguments may be balanced by the hazards in any process of
group litigation in which individuals and their own lawyers play little
or no role: that the attorneys for the group and their adversaries (the
defendants) will manage to pick up most of the goodies at the settlement table, leaving only the scraps for the almost anonymous and
faceless members of the injured class. 3 9 Although I believe these
hazards tend to be overstated by some critics of class action settlements, it remains important to make a substantive case for different
treatment of a mass tort. To be sure, the question then becomes essentially one of substantive tort law, but I regard it as inappropriate
(and even counter-productive) to consider any major procedural issue
in a vacuum. Procedure, in my view, is primarily the means of determining substantive rights and liabilities, and this subordinate role is
especially significant in an area that is as dynamic as that of modern
tort law.
This task is complicated by the fact that mass torts can take so
many forms, in terms of the nature of the harm, its causes, and the
extent of individual damage. My own doubts that there is a convincing across-the-board argument for different substantive treatment lead
me to use only a few examples (but important ones) as my point of
departure. Perhaps the strongest example involves the mass toxic tort
in which a large number of individuals, as a result of exposure to a
mass tort class action cases. See, e.g., Rosenberg, IndividualizedJustice, supra note 2, at
241-44 & n. 83. For other valuable discussions of the costs, benefits, and techniques
of averaging damages within the group-from the standpoint of both social and individual welfare see Bone, StatisticalAdjudication, supra note 2, and KAPLOW, supra note
36.
The concept of a choice made "behind the veil," as I understand it in this context, is not one that connotes a withholding of information from the individual by
lawyers, experts, orjudges. (Indeed, the existence of such information about known
differences among potential or actual claims may undermine the appropriateness of
class treatment on some or all issues.) Rather, the concept assumes that in light of
the controlling law and the facts as known, or reasonably accessible, a rational, normally risk-averse actor would prefer class treatment (even with an accompanying averaging of outcomes) to the heavy costs and highly uncertain results of individual
action-although that same individual might well oppose class treatment if he could
know the outcome of his individual lawsuit.
39 Many commentators have written of the hazards of settlements in class action
cases-of the dangers that class members' interests will take a back seat to the interests of the defendants and of lawyers for the class, and that judges will not have the
incentive to review such settlements with the rigor necessary to protect class interests.
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2; Koniak, supra note 2; Trangsrud, supra note 2, at 82-64;
Wolfinan & Morrison, supra note 2.
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potentially harmful chemical (produced by a smaller number of manufacturers), allege injury in the form of an increased risk of incurring
a "non-signature" disease. 40 Putting to one side all problems of choice
of law in our complex federal system (problems that will be considered later), I see this "wrong" as substantively different from the one41
on-one tort (say, a car accident) in several significant respects.
First, while there is seldom any question whose car hit whom in
the auto accident case, there may often be a total lack of proof as to
whose product affected which class member in the toxic tort case, and
thus the most meaningful way of addressing the issue of exposure is
with respect to the class as a whole. If defendant A had a one-third
market share of a fungible product that was evenly distributed
throughout the affected area by all manufacturers, we can say with
considerable confidence that defendant A was responsible for onethird of the class's exposure to the product, even though we can only
say with respect to any individual class member that (absent other in-

40 Many instances could be cited, but perhaps the best known involves the claims
of Vietnam veterans and their families that they were exposed to harmful contaminants as the result of the use of Agent Orange as a defoliant in the Vietnam War. For
an extraordinarily readable and informative recounting and analysis of the Agent Orange litigation, see PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DIsASTERS
IN THE COURTS (enlarged ed. 1987).
The question whether someone who has been exposed to a particular product
has incurred an increased risk of harm as a result of that exposure may arise before or
after the harm has occurred. (The harm may be a signature disease, like asbestosis, or
a non-signature disease, like lung cancer.) If the harm has not yet occurred, there is a
question as to whether there is a present cause of action based on the probability of
future harm. That question is governed by the applicable substantive law; there is
surely no constitutional bar to recognition of a cause of action based on an increased
risk of future physical harm (a risk that can result in present psychological and even
financial burdens), and as indicated below, there may be strong policy reasons for
according such recognition.
41 For the discussion that follows, I am especially indebted to the pioneering
works by David Rosenberg, several of which are cited supranote 2. See also Rosenberg,
Causal Connection, supra note 36. This last cited article played an important role in
Judge Weinstein's analysis of the issues of liability in the Agent Orange litigation. See
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 833-38 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
A recent Columbia Law Review symposium dedicated to Judge Weinstein included several articles exploring the implications of his approach for the development of liability and compensation rules in mass tort cases. See, e.g., Margaret A.
Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Toward a New Theory of Justice and Toxic
Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1217 (1997);John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and
Just Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2034 (1997).
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formation) there is one chance in three that he was exposed to the
42
product of defendant A.

Second, similar points can be made with respect to other aspects
of the tort. Thus if we focus on the question of causation of a "nonsignature" disease, we may not have sufficient data to say with any reasonable degree of assurance (and certainly not by a preponderance of
the evidence) that an individual's exposure to the defendant's product was in fact the cause of his disease. Yet with the same data, we may
be able to say with considerable confidence that a specified increase
in the rate of the disease with respect to the class as a whole was caused by
exposure to the product in question-that X members of the class
43
would not have contracted the disease in the absence of exposure.
The thrust of these points is that even though it may make little
sense, in terms either of the traditional view of tort law or of the aims
of the tort system, to allow individual recoveries in individual actions
against individual defendants, it makes eminent sense, in light of the
goals of effective deterrence and reasonable compensation, to make
(or agree to) an award-often and inevitably based on probabilistic
calculations-to the class as a whole.4 Surely, if this is so, the "mass
tort" of this kind is substantively different from the auto accident case.
42 True, the statement about the individualclass member may (under the given
assumptions) be asserted with equal assurance. But the desirability of making that
fact a basis of liability (say, for one-third of the plaintiff's damages) is far shakier if the
tort is not viewed as "collective" in nature. For example, consider a tort that does not
have this collective character. If we are reasonably sure, on the basis of all available
information, that the chances are only one in three that B was hit by A's car (rather
than by that of another driver), it is far more debatable-as well as a more radical
departure from our tradition-to hold A liable for one-third of B's damages.
43 Each of these factors can, of course, be complicated by changing the facts, so
that for example, the product is not entirely fungible (as in the Agent Orange litigation, where the products of different manufacturers contained widely varying percentages of dioxin contamination); the degree of exposure varies from one class member
to another; or the class members themselves vary with respect to such relevant behavior as smoking, urban or rural residence, etc. But these complications do not necessarily make the point inapplicable or irrelevant; rather, they may make the process of
determining the extent of liability and damage more complex and may require the
creation of subclasses.
44 Deterrence may be the sole value served in the "small claim" case, but its significance should not be downplayed in torts involving substantial harm to individuals.
(Indeed, in the view of some, deterrence remains the primary justification for a civil
tort system in such cases.) And surely, a more acceptable level of deterrence is
achieved by assessing the costs of injury avoidance in the light of the reasonably foreseeable harm to the entire class of victims rather than on the basis of the disparate
recoveries (and failures to recover) that may be anticipated in lawsuits brought by a
self-selected fraction of those injured.
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And the difference is one militating strongly in favor of the second
model.
Other mass torts may present a less persuasive case for such differentiation. But even the closest case to the one-on-one auto accident-the airplane crash or other "single episode" disaster-does
present certain distinguishing factors. For example, while an award of
punitive damages to an individual plaintiff in an auto accident case
may not present serious problems of overdeterrence if the award is
properly calibrated, separate awards of punitive damages to each individual injured in a mass accident case, if made without regard to other
comparable awards, may wholly frustrate the goal of achieving an ac45
ceptable level of deterrence.
Even apart from punitive damages, the uncertain and, to some
extent, arbitrary and random nature of jury awards in individual actions involving a mass accident may result in inequitable compensation to the individual plaintiffs (too much to some, too little to
others). And unless the average recovery in those cases that do go to
judgment and that set the pattern for later settlements is reasonably
related to actual harm, the sum of individual damages may bear little
resemblance in total to the amount that will serve the goal of effective
deterrence. Moreover, the problem is aggravated, if liability is not determined on a basis common to the class (either through a class action or through some application of preclusion principles 46 ), by the
possibility that liability will itself be found in some cases and not in
others.
In sum, there is a strong case for the view that a mass tort is, and
should be treated as, substantively different from a one-on-one tort
from the perspective of both major objectives of the tort system, and
45 There is wide disagreement on whether, and to what extent, the concept of
punitive damages has any place in a system of private civil remedies. After all, the
award of punitive damages to a plaintiff has the characteristics of a windfall because it
is unrelated to the injury done to that plaintiff and may far exceed the monetary loss
attributable to that injury. Perhaps the strongestjustification for such an award lies in
the need to make up for the underenforcement likely to occur when each injured
individual must pursue his own remedy. But punitive damage awards may result in
overdeterrence too, for example, if most of those injured in a mass accident bring
separate suits and obtain sizable punitive damage awards, each of which is made without regard to other suits and other awards.
For excellent analyses of the role of punitive damages in civil cases, see ALI, ENTERPRISE LIABILITy FOR PERSONAL INJURY, ch. 9 (1991); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
46 With respect to the availability of preclusion principles in such cases, see supra
note 37.
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that such treatment would (or at least should) be recognized as desirable by the members of the affected class.
Thus far, the problem has been primarily addressed from the
standpoint of the members of the class, whose interests in autonomy
and in individual choice have been the major factors weighed against
the gains to class members from entity treatment. But the broader
social interests at stake need to be recognized too, since the measure
of efficiency and due process does require a balancing of the interest
of the individual against the other social concerns that are affected. 4 7
In this case, the second model seems preferable both for the administration of the civil justice system and for the interests of litigants other
than the plaintiff class. For the system itself, the ability to resolve a
mass dispute in a single, consolidated proceeding, while not without
difficulties of management and control, 48 offers distinct advantages
over the task of managing scores, or even thousands, of suits in state
and/or federal courts throughout the country. 49 As for the party or
parties opposing the class, they may perhaps lose the power to wear
down each individual opponent with superior resources, but such a
loss is not one that should cause distress to those who seek to optimize
social welfare. 50 The gain is that the overall outcome will either exonerate the defendant in a single, fully, and thoroughly litigated proceeding or, if fault is found and if adequate safeguards are observed,
will end in an award more likely to approximate the actual measure of
harm caused by the wrongful conduct than could the sum total
awarded in a relatively arbitrary group of individual actions that are
filed and pursued to judgment.
A related point bears on the question of individual choice and
autonomy. Limits not only on individual resources, but on public re47 See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Metro-North Commuter MR.
v. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 (1997) (emphasizing the importance of considering
the social costs of enforcing individual claims).
48 For a case in which certification of a nationwide class was denied on the basis,
inter alia, of the asserted unmanageability of an action involving a huge class of people whose claims varied both factually and with respect to the governing law, see Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-45 (5th Cir. 1996).
49 These advantages underlie the current statutory provision for pretrial consolidation of related litigation brought in different federal districts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(1994), as well as the more ambitious and far-reaching proposals for consolidation
made in several studies-notably in ALI, CoMPLEx LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994) [hereinafter ALI Study].
50 This perceived (and perhaps misperceived) disadvantage of the class action to
the party opposing the class may well have been a major reason why a ban on class
actions (in the absence of the defendant's consent) was a key provision of the agreement with the tobacco companies referred to above. See supra note 1.
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sources as well may mean that the possibility of litigation by each victim of a mass tort, leading to a reasonably prompt disposition of each
such case, represents more a dream than a reality for many members
of the class. 5 1 Thus the choice is not so much between two workable
models as between a model that offers some hope of a reasonably
prompt and fair disposition and one that does not.
In the end, however, one's choice between models may turn not
so much on striking a balance among factors that are hard if not impossible to quantify but on less tangible, more subjective considerations. Thus, my own belief in the worth of the individual and the
virtues of autonomy does not carry me as far as it does those who
would place the highest premium on the individual's unfettered claim
to his personally shaped "day in court." In the context of litigation,
my thinking is influenced by the high cost of giving free rein to such a
claim and by skepticism about its practical value in a realm dominated
by expense and delay, uncertain outcomes, and professional representatives who make decisions for their clients at least as often as they
follow their clients' instructions. This skepticism seems to me especially warranted when the client is an individual and not a sophisticated, repeat-playing entity.
E. Some FurtherAspects of the Entity Model
I hope the discussion so far has at least opened your mind to the
possibility that the second model-one that focuses on the class as the
entity in litigation (both as party and as client) with respect to those
matters suitable for class treatment-is the preferable one. If so, the
next step, as part of the argument and as part of understanding its
implications, is to consider what the practical consequences of adopting that model would be. These consequences cover a broad range,
from the nature of the class action itself to the role of counsel and the
court, to the formulation of the substantive standards of determining
52
liability and the measure of relief.
51 Indeed, litigation that is individual in form may well be "collective" in substance in view of the almost inevitably interdependent nature of such actions in the
mass tort context.
52 Institutional questions of how the tasks of implementation should be allocated
will be examined infra Part III.
After reading an earlier draft of this article, Robert Bone asked a question that
was both probing and hard to answer: to what extent is the "entity" concept meant to
be simply descriptive of a conclusion and to what extent do I see it as having normative force of its own? The best response I can give is that, while the term is designed
primarily to represent a conclusion based on a range of policy considerations, the
conclusion has tended in my thinking to take on a life of its own and to generate
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1. To begin, at least three aspects of class treatment need to be
reconsidered. First, there is a growing school of thought, reflected in
both academic commentary and judicial decision, that certification of
a "mass tort" action under Rule 23(b) (3) should be limited to "mature" torts-those that have been through the grinder of individual
litigation in which courts and litigants have been able to develop both
expertise and experience in determining whether the defendant is liable and, if so, how to arrive at the appropriate measure of damages or
other relief.53 Until then, it is argued, everyone is engaging only in
guess work, and the possibility of a fair disposition-and especially of
a fair settlement-for the injured class as a whole is very low.
But if the second model is indeed preferable, it makes little sense
to defer class certification of what appears to be a mass tort, suitable in
some respects at least for class treatment, until the requisite number
of individual actions have been ground through the system. To the
extent that the early plaintiffs in such a process may find it especially
difficult to establish a case for liability or substantial damages, the class
becomes analogous to the soldier ants who, in their travels, reportedly
manage to cross even raging torrents by walking over the corpses of
those representatives who find themselves in the vanguard of the ad5 4
vancing army.
An alternative, more consistent with the second model yet retaining many of the advantages of the "maturity" theory, might be to allow
provisional certification of a class action when such a tort is brought
to the courts, to ensure adequate development of information
through discovery and even some form of trial (or multiple "bellwether" trials55 ), and then if the appropriateness of class treatment is
confirmed, to provide that all members of the class-including those
who litigated in the vanguard-shall share in the benefits of the ultisome further ideas. This ambivalence may well be desirable, but in any event I find it
virtually inescapable.
53 See, e.g., Castano,84 F.3d at 740, 747; McGovern, supra note 2, at 1841-45.
54 For criticism of the notion that the "maturity" of the asserted tort should be an
important factor in deciding whether to certify a class action, for example, Rosenberg,
End Games, supra note 2, at 707-13, and Case Comment, 110 HARv. L. REV. 977,
979-81 (1997).
55 The phrase is from a recent decision, In re Chevron U.SA., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016,
1019 (5th Cir. 1997). In this case, the district court, in a toxic waste litigation involv-

ing 3000 individual plaintiffs and intervenors, had ordered trial of 30 "bellwether"
cases, 15 to be selected by plaintiffs and 15 by defendants. In reversing this order, the
court of appeals said that such trials can be useful but insisted on assurance that they
would be representative, and further suggested that such assurance might be obtained by scientific sampling methods. Id. at 1020-21. On the value of scientific sam-

pling techniques in determining aggregate damages, see Saks & Blanck, supra note 2.
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mate disposition as to liability and damages on whatever basis is or56
dered or agreed to for the class as a whole.
A second important aspect of the class action device-the "right"
to notice-should be reexamined in terms of the real costs and benefits involved. 57 In those cases involving substantial harm to individuals, even viewing the class as the sole litigating party does not
undermine the value of requiring individual notice to all those who
can be identified with reasonable effort, so long as the cost is not so
high as to sound the death knell of the action. 58 If it is, then the
arguments for viewing the class as the litigant militate in favor of more
selective notice, so long as an adequately representative group of the
class (or of each potential subclass) is notified. Alternatively, it might
be feasible-as in the case of a request for preliminary relief-to have
some measure taken of the merits of the suit and, on that basis, to
have some or even all of the costs of notice imposed on the defendant
(to be deducted from any ultimate recovery).59
In the case of the "small claim" class action, requiring notice to
all those members whose whereabouts are reasonably accessible seems
even less sensible. The interest of the individual in the case is relatively low, as is the corresponding likelihood that any member of the
class will wish to spend the time and energy to monitor the action or
56 The "immaturity" of a tort, however, may be relevant to the fairness of a settlement, since the lack of information and experience may bear on the ability to estimate the value of the class claim (or the issue certified for class treatment) with
reasonable accuracy. Thus, it may be inappropriate to approve a settlement in such a
case if there has been inadequate discovery or other exchange of information relevant to an appraisal of the agreement reached. But cf. infra note 133 (discussing
Bruce Hay's analysis).
57 I pass over with only this brief reference, the problem that notice to class members may fall far short of explaining in accessible English what is at stake. The task of
formulating notice that tells class members what the dispute is all about, what they
may gain or lose, and what role they may play is not easy, but it is critical.
58 The notion that a ruling with respect to notice could impose such high costs
on the plaintiff class representatives as to force termination of the action was recognized in a number of "small claim" class actions after adoption of the 1966 amendments. But the Supreme Court held in Eisen that even in such a case, the rigorous
notice requirements of the rule (as interpreted by the Court) had to be observed, and
the costs of notice could not be imposed on the defendant. Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175-76 (1974).
Adoption of the proposal in text may warrant a requirement of some sort of
security (as in the case of a preliminary injunction) in order to give a measure of
protection to the defendant who is ultimately vindicated.
59 The Supreme Court in Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-79, rejected this approach as
inconsistent with Rule 23. But see Willging et al., supranote 2, at 176 (reporting that
despite the Eisen decision, ways are often found to avoid imposing the full costs of
notice on the plaintiff class representatives).
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will object to the very idea of class treatment. In these circumstances,
to insist on the widest possible notice is to use "due process" notions
as a method of effectively defeating the claim at the threshold and
depriving the polity of any social value it might have. It is far better to
provide for sufficient notice to make a representativegroup aware of the
action, so that the opportunity to object either to certification or to
the progress or handling of the action is not lost, while keeping the
60
cost of such notice within manageable bounds.
Although Rule 23, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, appears
to block these changes, broader and more flexible notions of due process, as articulated in such landmark cases as Mullane,6 1 do not. Here
again, the conception of due process has proved sufficiently sensitive
to practical needs to be adaptable to the costs and benefits involved
and to the substantive interests at stake.
Finally, the need for, and scope of, the opt-out right needs to be
reconsidered. In the early jurisprudence of class actions, as represented by such cases as Ben Hur62 and Hansbery,6 3 the focus of due
process considerations appeared to be the adequacy of representation; the ability to opt out was not emphasized, or even discussed. Indeed, even in the context of the first model I have posited, the notion
of the representative quality of the class action (similar to an action in
which a guardian represents a ward or a trustee a beneficiary) suggested that the key to the satisfaction of due process requirements was
only the adequacy of representation; notice to class members was not a
prerequisite, and a fortiori, neither was the opportunity to opt out.
60 If the claim is viewed as essentially that of the class as an entity, then at least in
some instances, effective relief could be devised that would benefit the class as a
whole without the heavy costs of ascertaining the identity of every individual class
member and then distributing some part of the award to each such individual. In a
small claim class action, for example, a means might be found of internalizing to the
defendant the cost of the wrong (and thus achieving the desired deterrent effect) by
ordering the establishment of a fund to lower the cost of purchase (or provide other
services) to class members in the future.
Indeed, in small claim class actions, even representative notice may be of little
value in comparison to such relatively untried techniques as having the court appoint
an advocate for the class, or giving an existing entity-like a trade union or consumer
organization-an incentive to safeguard the interests of the class.
61 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), still the
leading case on the requirement of notice, the Court stressed a variety of practical
considerations in holding that the expense of notification should be kept within reasonable bounds, and noted that it was justifiable to take "reasonable risks" that notice
might not actually reach every interested person. Id. at 319. (Mullane itself was not in
form a class action.)
62 Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
63 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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Thus, it is not surprising that when the rulemakers drafted the
revision of Rule 23 in 1966, they did not hesitate to provide that in
(b) (1) and (b) (2) actions, neither notice to every class member nor
the ability to opt out was to be required; indeed, the rule as written
appeared to preclude the ability to opt out. However, the (b) (3) action-seen as an experiment and an addition to the traditional class
action-was viewed differently, and so both notice and opt-out rights
were guaranteed. Some years later, these requirements were constitutionalized, at least in the context of Rule 23(b) (3), on the basis of the
64
briefest of discussions (and essentially in dictum) in the Shutts case.
Yet if the argument for entity treatment of the class is a persuasive
one in the case of all matters properly subject to class treatment, including those falling under Rule 23(b) (3), then it may well be that an
unconditional opt-out "right" is inappropriate with respect to any issue or set of issues that is suitable for class treatment. If there is a
clear need for an unconditional right to opt out, one wonders about
the soundness of the underlying decision to allow class treatment. On
the other hand, a conditional or limited ability to opt out may serve
the interests of the individual who (wisely or unwisely) insists on going
it alone, without undermining the interests of the group as a whole,
and may improve the level of monitoring of class counsel, and of the
action as a whole, and enhance the fairness of a settlement. 6 5 Moreover, with respect to the need for effective monitoring of the class
representative, holding the class together may offer more assurance
that those who care most about the outcome will work from within to
achieve the best possible result.
2. Just as the second model requires rethinking some important
aspects of the class action certification process, so it warrants a careful
study of the proper relations between lawyer and client with respect to
the class action aspects of a controversy. Indeed, it has been forcefully
suggested that, as the Supreme Court has recognized that a class action does not become moot upon the expiration of the substantive
claim of the designated class member, 66 so we should reexamine the
question whether a class action should be required to have a designated member as plaintiff in order to establish initial standing. 67 But
no matter how that question is resolved-and perhaps the retention
of the traditional form has relatively few costs and does help to pre64 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see infratext accompanying notes 111-12.
65 See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
66 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
67 See Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 61-96.
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serve the comfortably familiar appearance of more traditional litigation 68-if the class is seen as the litigating entity, then it should be
regarded not only as the party plaintiff but as the client. The analogy
to cases involving such entity plaintiffs as corporations and trade unions may make the point more tolerable and understandable.
Others have written in some detail about this need to focus on
the precise nature of the lawyer's professional responsibility in class
actions, 69 while still others have suggested that special treatment is unwarranted and inappropriate. 7 0 But even if the categories of individual and class representation should not (and cannot) be watertight,
the notion of paying special attention to ethical issues in the class action context has merit in several respects. For example, the dangers
of conflicts between the individual and the class may make it as
inappropriate for a lawyer to represent both the class and individual
members as to represent separate litigants. 71 Similarly, though communications between individual members and the class lawyer may be
both appropriate and necessary, the interests of the class may well preclude such communications from being considered privileged with respect to the class as a whole. And if class actions are to prove viable,
68 Congress has recently attempted to give content to the "lead plaintiff" notion
in federal securities cases. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (Supp. 1997), seeks to ensure that the lead plaintiff in such litigation
will be the shareholder with the largest stake in the outcome (usually an institutional
investor). This provision, along with others in the Act, was evidently designed to help
curb perceived abuses in such litigation-in this instance by trying to assure proper
monitoring of plaintiffs' counsel by a shareholder with the interest and capacity to
keep a close watch on the case. (Such monitoring is not, in my view, in any way
inconsistent with the entity model advocated here.)
For discussion of the 1995 Act, see Jill S. Fisch, ClassAction Reform: Lessons From
Securities Litigation, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 533 (1997) (suggesting, inter alia, that institutional investors may have investment objectives different from those of individual investors and that such institutional investors are themselves not exempt from the
dangers of collusive action with the defendant).
69 See, e.g., WErNSTEIn, supra note 2, ch. 4; Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at
96-103; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2.
70 See e.g., Mullenix, ParadigmMisplaced, supra note 2, at 582-89.
71 Just as the "entity" model bears some resemblance to the notion of a corporation acting for its shareholders, see supra text accompanying note 16, so too the suggestion in the text is analogous to the problems of conflict that may arise when a
lawyer for a corporation also undertakes to represent one of its employees.
Other problems that have been recognized in related contexts are analogous to
the problems in representing a class. For example, a lawyer should not represent two
clients who are each dealing with the same third person in a situation in which the
interests of the two clients are potentially in conflict. And in some instances, such as
an internecine struggle within a corporation, a lawyer for the corporation may be
obligated to remain neutral. (My thanks to Susan Koniak for these analogies.)
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special consideration may be required with respect to such matters as
"maintenance," "solicitation," and the financing of litigation.
This approach does not imply that class members should be deprived of a significant role in litigation brought on behalf of the class.
Even if the class is the relevant litigating entity, it is not one that can
act, think, or communicate on its own. In the case of a trade union or
corporation, there are preexisting individuals who have been authorized to speak for the entity and who normally would be the ones to
work with counsel. In the case of a class that is, in effect, created for
purposes of a particular litigation, there is likely to be no preexisting
structure, and methods should be devised for creating that structure
and endowing it with the widest representation consistent with efficient case management. 72 The precise role of any such group in the
conduct or settlement of the case, and the need to take periodic samplings of the entire class, are important issues that fall outside the
scope of this analysis, but the basic point remains: the class (like other
litigating entities) is the client, and its members should play a role not
as clients themselves but as representatives of the client.
3. Preference for the second model requires at least some rethinking of the role of the judge in dealing with issues certified for
class treatment. The need for the judge to play a more active part
than in conventional litigation at the critical stages of a class action,
and especially in passing on the fairness of a settlement, is reflected in
Rule 23 itself, 73 in the cases, 7 4 and in the literature. 75 How, then,
72 In some notable class actions-the Agent Orange controversy, for exampleinsufficient attention was paid to ways of requiring lawyers for the class to keep in
touch with a range of class representatives. While considerations of efficiency and of
the interests of the class as a whole must be factored in, the need for such communication is not obviated by recognition that the class is the represented entity; on the
contrary, its value-as one means of assuring that class counsel will fulfill their duty to
the class-may well be enhanced once the significance of the "designated" plaintiff as
representative is either eliminated or reduced in importance.
For what is probably still the best analysis of the issue of communication and
related issues, as well as of a range of suggested approaches, see Rhode, supranote 2.
73 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d), (e); Cf MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30 (3d ed.
1995) (providing gnidelines for the management of class actions).
74 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195
(5th Cir. 1981). In both cases, the court of appeals, in rejecting a settlement approved by the district court, emphasized the obligation of the districtjudge to ensure
the fairness of the settlement and of the fees to be awarded to class counsel.
75 See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, ch. 5; Kahan & Silberman, supra note 2 (addressing the extent of a state court's obligations in considering a settlement involving
exclusive federal claims); Resnik, Litigating and Settling, supra note 2 (addressing the
responsibility of judges for insuring fairness of settlements); Schwarzer, supra note 2
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would that role be affected if the interest to be protected is viewed as
that of the class (or subclass) as a whole, with the interests and concerns of particular members of the class being seen less as ends in
themselves than as an aspect of the treatment of the class of which
they are a part? In some instances, the difference might be insubstantial, but in others, the difference might well be outcome determinative. For example, even if one or more class members could persuade
the judge that they would do better if allowed to proceed individually
and thus that a proposed settlement is "unfair" to them, the judge
who had already decided to certify a class, and who remained convinced that the certification was sound,76 might well conclude that the
interests of the vast majority of class members-and thus of the class
as a whole-nevertheless warranted both retaining the class in its existing form and approving a settlement or compromise that maximized class interests. Such reasoning would be harder to justify if the
class were viewed as simply an aggregation of individuals for purposes
77
of litigation and negotiation.
4. Finally, and perhaps of greatest importance, recognition of the
entity model entails rethinking of the nature of the applicable substantive law governing the determination of liability and the scope of
an appropriate remedy. Consider the mass "toxic tort" in which a
large number of people have been exposed to a product and to a
resulting increased risk of, say contracting a particular disease. Viewing such a tort as affecting the class of exposed people as an "entity'
rather than as just an aggregation of individuals might lead to a
number of substantive conclusions. For example, the tort might more
(addressing the issues to be considered by the court in deciding whether to approve a
dismissal or compromise).
76 Such a showing, especially by a significant number, might persuade the judge
that the original certification needed to be reconsidered, or that an additional subclass should be created.
77 Again, the analogy to the interests of a bargaining unit as a whole in the terms
of a negotiated agreement offers a useful (if not perfect) analogy, especially if one
recalls that individual members of the unit may be unhappy not only with the terms of
an agreement but even with the very existence of a bargaining unit represented by a
particular union. (True, the "duty of fair representation" operates as a constraint on
the ability of a bargaining representative to subordinate the interests of the individual
to those of the group, but that constraint in itself has significant limits. Clearly, the
duty does not preclude reasonable tradeoffs, for example, of benefits for skilled workers in exchange for benefits for the less skilled, or of larger dollar increases per average employee in exchange for percentage increases that would provide greater
increases to some members.) See supra note 17.
For general discussion of the authority of the bargaining representative, and the
limits on that authority, see JuLius G. GETmAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS

96-150 (1988).
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readily be viewed as occurring at the time of exposure, whether or not
the exposure has caused ascertainable physical injury to particular
class members; 78 the determination of liability might turn on a decision that the increase in risk to the class as a whole was more than
minimal; the amount properly assessed against the defendant might
turn on the best available evidence of the percentage increase in the
risk to the entire class, and any recovery might take the form (at least in
significant part) of an insurance fund from which each class member
can draw benefits if and when the anticipated harm occurs. Moreover, the very concept of a tort committed against the entire class,
with the incidents I have suggested, militates strongly against the idea
of having the laws of differentjurisdictions apply to different members
79
of the class. A single applicable law is almost a sine qua non.
Il.

THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE

A.

Eirr y

APPROACH

The Implicationsfor Federalism

In a recent study of the defects and virtues of American federalism, I suggested that given our constitutional structure and the policies underlying it, the burden of adopting a "national" solution when
one is not mandated by the Constitution itself, should rest on the advocates of such a solution.80 (And, given the large area in which questions of allocation of power are left to the discretion of the
lawmakers,8 1 the assignment of this burden is significant.)
78 The problem of whether the substantive law recognizes a cause of action for
mental distress (and such related claims as the need for medical monitoring) caused
by exposure to a harmful product arose in two recent Supreme Court cases, in very
different contexts. In Metro-North CommuterRailroadv. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. 2113 (1997),
the Court interpreted the Federal Employers Liability Act not to permit recovery by
"exposure-only" plaintiffs when no manifest physical injury had occurred and stressed
its understanding of common law principles in reaching this result. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2243 (1997), the Court simply noted that under

some potentially applicable laws, "exposure-only" plaintiffs might not have a viable
cause of action. See generally supra note 1.

79

On the need for a single applicable law in the mass tort context, compare ALI

Study, supra note 50, at 305 (proposing federal choice of law standards for multistate
tort and contract cases), with Mullenix, The Mass-Tort Case, supra note 2, at 1095 (pro-

posing, inter alia, congressional authorization for the development of federal common law in mass tort cases), and Kramer, supranote 2 (criticizing proposals for special
treatment of choice of law issues in mass tort cases).
80
81

A DIALOGUE 119-21 (1995).
See id. at 76 & n.73, 118-19. Even with the important judicial limitations

DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM:

placed on the scope of national power by the Supreme Court in the few years since
my study was published, see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
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If the entity theory is a persuasive one, it does not follow that a
national solution is always preferable for any matter that is appropriate for class treatment.8 2 Many incidents affecting significant numbers of people occur largely or entirely within a single state. At least
when those affected are primarily residents of that state (as, for example, in the case of a toxic tort affecting only a particular residential
area), surely there is no justification for bringing in heavy national
artillery. Even if the incident within a single state does affect a significant number of "out-of-staters," as in a mass disaster like the fire at the
Dupont Plaza Hotel in Puerto Rico, 83 it may not follow that the applicable law governing liability should be national. The line between
such incidents affecting mostly "in-staters" and those affecting people
from all over may be too arbitrary to warrant national preemption of
local rules governing conduct and liability. But the danger that the
hotel's liability would vary from one injured person to another depending on the fortuity of that person's domicile (if that is the forum's choice of law rule) does suggest the value of a national decision
that those aspects of the case suitable for class treatment should be
governed by a single applicable law-most reasonably the law of the
place where the injury occurred.

4

In some mass disaster cases-for example, one involving a plane
crash on an interstate flight-the location of the crash and of the resulting injuries is, surely, more fortuitous than the location of a hotel
fire. Thus in such a case, especially one involving an inherently interstate activity (like transportation across state lines), the case may be a
strong one for national intervention going beyond the formulation of
a choice of law rule. If, for example, a plane on an interstate flight
crashes into a mountain in Tennessee as a result of faulty equipment
or pilot error, is there any reason why Tennessee law should apply to
questions of liability and/or damages when Tennessee had little or no
85
regulatory control over the activity in the first place?
(1995), the scope of discretion left to the policymakers is still very broad (and in my
view, desirably so).
82 Of course, such issues can and do arise in contexts that have long been the

subject of national law-antitrust and securities regulation, for example.
83 For a description of the litigation that followed this disastrous fire, and of the
ultimate settlement, see Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, UnderstandingMass
PersonalInjury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROoK. L. REv. 961, 976-77 (1993).

Since the hotel was a resort whose guests came from many places outside Puerto Rico,
many of those injured or killed by the fire were nonresidents of the Commonwealth.
84 See ALI Study, supra note 49, § 6.01, cmt b.
85 Admittedly, the range of possible cases is considerable, as is the degree of state
regulatory control and interest. The state may have a much greater interest in the
applicability of its law to an accident involving the passengers on an interstate bus trip
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At the other end of the spectrum from, say, the pollution of the
wells in a local community is the mass toxic tort affecting users of a
product in virtually every state and some foreign countries. In such a
case, there are strong policy reasons favoring uniform treatment of all
those exposed to the risks created by the defendant's conduct, and
given the dispersion of people harmed, it makes little sense for the
applicable law to be that of any particular state. Should the legal
rights of a Massachusetts resident in such a case (a) be different from
those of a Vermont resident, or (b) depend on the particular state in
which the defendant was acting when the product was manufactured
or released? 86 And what if the product was a fungible one, produced
by several manufacturers located in different states, with no way of
telling with any reasonable level of confidence who was exposed to
whose product? Surely, such an example would be an appealing one
for a nationally applicable set of substantive rules even under my first
model of a class action. 87 Acceptance of an entity theory along the
lines suggested here makes the case for a uniform national set of substantive rules an even more compelling one.
Indeed, once the virtue of a uniform set of rules is recognized in
such cases, policymakers can begin to think more seriously about the
value of a shift away from the conventional tort system to a system
involving some form of administrative handling of claims-perhaps
even a system rooted more in notions of first party (or some mix of
first and third party) insurance than in received notions of liability
based on fault. 8 While such speculation is beyond the scope of this
essay and more properly within the domain of those whose central
concern is the prevention and remediation of accidents, the conditions for considering that course can only be present when the need
for uniform national treatment is accepted as a predicate.
(and a somewhat greater interest if the passengers were riding an interstate train)
than it would have in a crash on an interstate plane trip.
86 To be sure, the policy considerations here do not run entirely in the direction
of a national rule. It may be argued, for example, that local lawmakers should be able
to choose the level of protection for their residents, or of liability for their industries.
But for me, the balance in this context tilts in favor of a national rule.
87 The first model, which is based on the view that a class action is but an aggregation of individual actions, is more fully described above at text accompanying notes

7-8.
88 For discussion of the pros and cons of various insurance-based alternatives to
existing tort rules, see, for example, STmHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND

(1989); Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993); Rosenberg, End Games, supra
note 2, at 726-30.
BUSINESS
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The Allocation of Lawmaking Responsibility Between Courts as
Adjudicators and Either Courts or Legislatures as Rule
Promulgators(the Question of Rules v. Standards)

The relative virtues of rules and of standards have furnished the
battleground for some of the richest and most varied debates in the
realms of both theoretical and applied jurisprudence.8 9 Advocates of
increased reliance on rules-prescriptions thought to speak with suffi89 Once again, an exhaustive bibliography of relevant scholarly work bearing on
this topic would take a full-sized appendix, but a briefer one may be of use for purposes of research, as well as for internal cross-reference herein. Books and articles
that deal with the rules-standards debate (and with related questions of formalist and
positivist approaches to law) and that I have found especially helpful, include: H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (2d ed. 1994); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 42-61, 247-61 (1990); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES
(1991); ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTAuSM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 19-38,
136-75 (1982);J. M. Balkin, IdeologicalDrift and the Struggle over Meaning 25 CONN. L.
REv. 869 (1993); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL. STUD. 257 (1974); Richard H. Fallon, "The Rule of Law" as a
Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97 CoLuM. L. RExv. 1 (1997); Stanley Fish, The Law
Wshes to Have a FormalExistence, in THE FATE OF LAW 159 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds. 1991); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1983);
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE LJ. 557 (1992);
Larry Kramer,JudicialAsceticism, 12 CARmozo L. REV. 1789 (1991); Burt Neuborne, Of
Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary Selection
Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 419 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Formalism,97 YALE L.J.
509 (1988); Anthony J. Sebok, MisunderstandingPositivism, 93 MicH. L. REV. 2054
(1995); EricJ. Segall, Justice Scalia, CriticalLegal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 CEO.
WASH. L. REv. 991 (1994); Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465
(1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: TheJustices ofRules and Standards,106 HARv. L.
REv. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problemswith Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995); Mark
V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502
(1985); Mark V. Tushnet, The Degradation of ConstitutionalDiscourse, 81 GEO. LJ. 251
(1992); Mark V. Tushnet, Scalia and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A FoolishFormalism?,
12 CARDOzo L. REv. 1717 (1991); ErnestJ. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent
Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988); Robert Weisberg, The CalabresianJudicial
Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1983);James G. Wilson,
The Morality ofFormalism,33 UCLA L. REv. 431 (1985) [hereinafter Wilson, Formalism];
James G. Wilson, Suroeying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARiz. ST. LJ. 773 (1995). /
Scholarly efforts to bring the debate down to cases-to focus intensively on the
issues in a particular context-are a good deal less common (although many of the
works listed above contain valuable illustrations). One interesting recent study, in an
area of my own interests, is Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard:Qualified Immunity in
an Age of ConstitutionalBalancingTests, 81 IOWA L. REv. 261 (1995) (urging a transition
from standards to rules in the area of qualified official immunity from suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)). Another incisive and valuable study in a different area and
with a different perspective is Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, PracticalReasoning
and the Dynamic Nature of FederalIndian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990).
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cient clarity to enable actors to predict in advance the lawfulness of
their conduct-emphasize such arguments as the value of predictability in planning, the lower costs of interpretation and application when
prescriptions are clear, and the decrease in the potentially arbitrary
power of the decisionmaker when her discretion is narrowed.9 0 Critics of rule-based approaches to law cover an even broader range. At
one end of the spectrum are the rule-skeptics, who argue that rules
cannot truly increase predictability but only serve to mask the exercise
of discretion by decisionmakers. 9 1 Operating in a different sector of
this tradition are those who acknowledge that rules do confine discretion but argue that such confinement all too often serves to prevent
just results by the over- or under-inclusiveness of the rules themselves-by their inability to forecast the infinite variety of problems
that will arise in their administration and by their narrowing of the
necessary discretion to deal with those problems. 92 A group harder to
classify, except perhaps as working within the utilitarian tradition, includes those who see rules as more appropriate when, for example,
the costs of formulation are relatively low and the costs of interpretation and application relatively high, or when the value of predictable
93
planning is great.
To some extent, the debate is between advocates of legislative
supremacy and those who favor administrative or judicial discretion in
applying flexible standards-a debate, in other words, involving the
roles to be played by the various branches of government. Thus, to
complicate the issues, one can believe in the value of legislative enactment of flexible standards, vesting the courts (or agencies) that apply
those standards with authority to develop the more particular rules
that will in turn govern private conduct. Or, one may believe that
discretion should always remain in the decider of the case at handfor example by refusing to elaborate on the meaning of negligence so
that ajury will not be restrained in determining whether due care was
exercised in the case before it.
In areas that come within the procedural realm, or that touch on
that realm, the issues are complicated in a different way. In virtually
every American jurisdiction, courts have significant rulemaking au90 See, e.g., Schauer, Formalism,supra note 90; cf. Wilson, Formalism, supranote 89,
at 484 (concluding at 484, with two cheers for formalism, but not a third).
91 Few present day scholars would probably lay claim to the title of total rule
skeptic Oust as few would lay claim to the legacy of Langdellian formalism), but intimations of considerable rule skepticism may be found in several works, including
Balkin, supra note 89; Fish, supra note 89; Grey, supranote 89; Tushnet, supra note 89.
92 See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 89; Singer, supra note 89.
93 See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 89; Kaplow, supra note 89.
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thority in procedural matters, and that authority is generally shared
with the legislature. 9 4 Thus the question of reliance on rules or standards is only in part a question of allocation of authority between
branches. Often, the question is whether the courts should deal with
the problem as fully as possible in the exercise of their "legislative," or
rulemaking, authority, or should leave the matter to be worked out
through a common-law process that may or may not give more precise
content to open-ended standards. To take an example outside the
topic of class actions, the question may arise as to the admissibility of
evidence whose relevance may be outweighed by its potentially prejudicial effect. Should a judicially legislated "rule of evidence" consist
only of an open-ended statement-for example, when potential prejudice outweighs relevance the evidence should be excluded? 95 If so,

should the courts in administering that rule develop a set of more
concrete "sub-rules" that increases predictability but reduces judicial
discretion? If not, should the legislated rule attempt to give a partial
or even exhaustive list of more specific cases in which evidence should
96
be excluded on this ground?
This discussion may help set the stage for the problem at hand.
Assume, at least while reading this section, that the case for the entity
model is a persuasive one, that courts have been flirting with the ideas
implicit in the model, but that the existing standards and rules tend to
favor a more individualistic approach to litigation-that there must be
a fairly substantial shift in our thinking about litigation for the entity
model to gain ground (and that to some extent that shift may have to
infiltrate our notions of procedural due process). To what extent
should we look to the common law to move incrementally in the direction of this new model-or even to remain in the limbo of case-bycase application of different approaches-and to what extent should

94 NewJersey may be one of the few jurisdictions (if not the only one) in which
the governing law has been construed to exclude legislative power over judicial practice and procedure. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406 (NJ. 1950), discussed in
RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIELJ. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WEC HSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 674-75 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER].

95 See FED. R. Evm. 403.
96 For examples in which the Federal Rules of Evidence have either added to or
displaced the broad standard of Rule 403 with more detailed rules addressing the
prejudice/relevance issue, see Rule 404 (character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes); Rule 412 (evidence of prior sexual behavior in
sex offense cases); Rule 413 (evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases); Rule
414 (evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases).
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we seek the enactment of rules (whether by legislatures or by courts97 )
that will set us more firmly and more rapidly on the new course?
Implicit in this phrasing of the question is a premise that should
be made explicit. I do not include myself among those rule skeptics
who argue that the formulation of rules is not only undesirable but
unavailing-that discretion cannot be effectively cabined by such enactments. Rather, I find convincing the view of scholars like H.L.A.
Hart, who have urged that rules have cores, penumbras, and limits:
even though they cannot be self-applying, they can and do serve effec98
tively to restrict the choices open to those who apply them.
By rejecting rule skepticism and embracing some degree of preference for rules, I am aligning myself with those who are part of an
emerging neo-formalist (perhaps a better phrase is "neo-formalizing")
approach.9 9 This approach does not embrace the theory that rules
are themselves derived from a set of axiomatic principles, and that the
rules in turn, as a matter of syllogistic logic, determine outcomes as
soon as the facts are discerned. Rather, it recognizes the significant
role played by questions of policy in the formulation of both standards
and rules, and the significance of interpretation in the application of
those rules and the determination of their proper limits. The approach, then, is as far from mechanical jurisprudence as the new realism is from the extreme view that any talk about government under
law is only a sham. 10 0
There are undoubtedly advantages in leaving developments to
the common law tradition, with room for both incremental movement
and continuing discretion. 10 1 For example, such an approach can
pour new wine into old bottles so artfully that even those who watch
these matters closely may wake up to the magnitude of the shift only
after it is an accomplished fact. Moreover, even if the shift is perceptible while it is going on, it is more likely to respond to the needs and
demands of particular cases than a set of rules formulated in advance.
97
98
99

That issue is more fully explored infra Part III.C.
See HART, supra note 89, ch. VII.
Perhaps the foremost American scholar to advocate a sophisticated, nuanced

version of a formalistic approach is Frederick Schauer. See, e.g.,

SCHAUER,

supra note

89; Schauer, supra note 89.
100 For an insightful discussion of the contribution of a formalist approach in one
area-that of constitutional interpretation, see Fallon, supranote 89, at 14-17, 28-30,
48-51. Cf Sebok, supra note 89 (defending both positivism and formalism against
their harsher critics); Segall, supra note 89, at 1042 ("The rule of law cannot exist
without significant notice of what the law requires ....
The rule of law, however,
requires both judicial restraint and judicial discretion.").
101 See Schuck, supra note 2 (analyzing the pros and cons of common law policymaking in this area).
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And finally, if the matter under consideration relates in significant
part to the conduct and character of litigation, the need for predictability is plainly less than in those areas of primary conduct that require clarity in order to facilitate the planning of people's affairs.
Nevertheless, I lean toward heavier reliance on the "legislative"
rulemaking process as integral to development of the entity model,
and I do so for several reasons. First, the shift contemplated is one of
sufficient magnitude to be worthy of open debate: is it a good idea, at
least in some contexts, and if so, how fast should we go and where
should we begin? Such a debate should take place openly in the context of legislative rulemaking, not in a shadowy setting where we are
not even sure what is happening. Second, and closely related, the
question of the appropriateness of moving to this model (or of continuing a process already begnn) strikes me as too bound up with issues
involving our fundamental values to be left primarily to judges acting
in the common law tradition. 10 2 Third, there is an interplay between
this issue and the issue of federalism discussed in the previous section.
If developments at a national level are an important part of the process of change, the use of a common-law approach is especially suspect. To the extent the questions are procedural, federal "common
law" rules will not (and in my view, should not) trump state rules
under the Erie doctrine, 10 3 if the rules in any way collide with policies
of importance to the states. And many of these issues arise in areas
where the existing rules governing liability are themselves furnished
102 I have argued in another context-involving the adoption of "strong" paternalist
rules governing human conduct-that "legislative" action is more appropriate than
judicial development for a major departure from traditional and accepted values, so
long as the question is not one of constitutional dimension. See Shapiro, supranote 5,
at 551-72.
103 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). To oversimplify one of the most complex evolutions of doctrine in the realm ofjudicial federalism, Erieheld that unless a valid federal law otherwise required, state substantive law is
controlling in a federal court whether that state law is codified law or common law.
Byrd stated that, in a federal court case governed by Erie, a federal practice must yield
to state law when the state law is "bound up with state-created rights and obligations."
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535. And Hannaheld this doctrine inapplicable when the matter in
question was within the scope of a federal rule promulgated by Congress in the exercise of its legislative authority over federal procedure, or by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its delegated power to promulgate rules of federal procedure. Thus, the
"legislative" power of the federal courts to "trump"state law by adopting a procedural
rule is greater than their power to do so by a "rule" developed in the course of
adjudication.
For a fuller, less simplistic analysis of these and related cases, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 94, at 714-31.
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by state law. To the extent the questions are "substantive," principles
of both federalism and separation of powers have long been recognized as militating in favor of a limited role for federal common
4
law. 10
Of course, a preference for the adoption of rules does not deny
the value of proceeding slowly or of leaving some scope for judicial
creativity in interpreting and applying the rules. 10 5 Rules, as H.L.A.
Hart has noted, are generally "open-texture [d]" at the margins, and
leave room for the exercise ofjudgment. 10 6 Moreover, the first major
efforts at rulemaking need not be comprehensive; rather, they could
start in areas where the case for an entity approach is least controversial-the small claims of a very large number, for example-and then
perhaps move into more controversial areas raising more serious and
debatable issues of the effect on individual litigating autonomy and
choice.
C.

The Allocation of the Rulemaking Task Between Courts
and Legislatures

A final, but critical, set of questions about the institutional implications of the suggested approach involves the allocation of authority
between the legislative and judicial branches. To say that rules have
an important role to play is not to resolve those questions in an area
where courts as well as legislatures have significant rulemaking authority. Rather, it is necessary to look hard at the proper limits ofjudicial
authority over "procedure" and at the interplay between that authority
and legislative power to fashion rights, obligations, and remedies.
This set of questions can arise in any jurisdiction, state or federal,
that draws similar distinctions between judicial and legislative
rulemaking authority. But the problem is of particular importance
and interest at the federal level both because of the nationwide conse104 For discussion of the sources, role, and appropriate scope of federal common

law, and a bibliography of the leading scholarly studies in the area, see HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 94, ch. VII.
105 A number of scholars have pointed out that the comparative value of rules and
standards will vary with the context-with such questions as relative cost, the need for
predictability, and the appropriateness of judicial discretion. See, e.g., HART, supra
note 89, ch. VII; Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 89; Kaplow, supra note 89.
106 HART, supra note 89, at 133, 252. A postscript in the second edition of this
work, id. at 238-76, contains an illuminating discussion of the differences and similar-

ities between Hart's view of the room for discretionary judgments at the margin of
rules, and Ronald Dworkin's view that the law is never really incomplete. Whoever
has the better of this debate, there is no doubt that ajudge has more flexibility at the
margin of a rule than at its core.
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quences of federal action and because of the reluctance (discussed
above) to rely on federal common law as a vehicle for the development of substantive rules. For these reasons, the discussion that follows will center on the questions of allocation of authority between
the federal legislative and judicial branches.
Few would disagree, I think, that certain areas of change, if they
are to take place at the federal level, must be the responsibility of the
legislature.' 0 7 For example, if there is to be federal law governing the
rights and duties of injurers and victims in the realm of mass toxic
torts, surely the definition of the tort-when actionable injury has occurred, the bases of liability, the standard of proof, and the measure
of recovery-are substantive matters appropriate not for judicial
rulemaking but for legislative action. The harder questions arise in
the twilight sphere presented by such issues as the grounds for class
treatment, the requisites of notice and adequate representation, the
limitations that should be imposed on the opportunity to opt out of
the class, and the conditions under which settlements should be approved or disapproved.
Scholars have debated for decades the proper scope of the
rulemaking power vested in the Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act (REA) .108 And with respect to the class action provisions of
107 I leave to others the assessment of the political factors that may encourage or
discourage legislative action at either the state or federal level. While this question is
surely a basic one in considering what can in fact be accomplished, I do not share the
view that a matter properly for the legislative branch should be taken over by the
courts because political pressures render the legislature incapable of action. If those
pressures do lead to inertia on an issue that is properly one for the legislature, the
answer is to try to overcome that inertia, not to evade it by looking to an inappropriate source for the change that is sought. See also infra text accompanying note 115.
Of course, the matter is not quite so simple. There are times when the very
existence of legislative inertia may signal the need for constitutional protection of
those who do not have the legislative clout to receive the treatment to which they have
ajust claim. Such a problem (like that of the underrepresentation of certain groups
in the legislature) may well be viewed as one of constitutional dimension warranting
judicial action. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dismusr 77-78, 120-24
(1980). But nothing in the topic under discussion here rises to that level. On the
contrary, some of the ideas advanced in this essay will raise serious constitutional
questions of their own if and when they are adopted.
108 The critical provision of the Act vesting rulemaking authority in the Supreme
Court is 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994), which states, inter alia, that the Court has the power
to prescribe rules of practice and procedure, subject to the limitation that "[s]uch
rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."
An excellent summary of the debate-which includes references to leading cases
and commentaries, as well as detailed analyses of the "relation back" provisions of
FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c) and of the ownership requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (gov-
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Rule 23, concerns about the substantive impact of the rule have been
intensified by the controversy over recent proposals for change.10 9
My own take on this issue stems from a view of the Enabling Act
as a more limited delegation of authority than the Supreme Court
itself has recognized in such decisions as Sibbach" and Hanna."' I
am persuaded by Stephen Burbank's extensive study, that in granting
a limited power to promulgate rules, Congress was concerned more
about protecting its own prerogatives as an elected national legislature
than about the danger that the rules would run afoul of the powers of
the states as expressed in the Rules of Decision Act.1 12 (Thus, a question of the proper limits of the rulemaking power under the REA is
presented as much by a rule's applicability in the context of a federal
claim as in that of a state law claim in a diversity case. 113) I also find
erning derivative actions)-may be found in 19 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 4509, 4510 (1996).
109 For recent scholarly discussion of the validity and substantive impact of Rule
23, and of various proposed amendments to the rule, see, for example, Carrington &
Apanovitch, supra note 2; Marcus, supra note 2; Mullenix, Constitutionality, supranote
2; Priest, supra note 2.
The article by Priest, supra note 2, is especially noteworthy in its critique of what
is described in the opening summary as "recent reform efforts... to impose substantive controls on mass tort class actions through procedural means." Id. at 522. Contending that certification of a case for class action treatment confers "unfair
negotiating power" on the plaintiff class, Priest urges that certification should not be
allowed if the court determines at the pre-certification stage that "the underlying substantive claim is without merit." Id. at 573.
In its recent decision in Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997),
the Court noted the constraints imposed by the Enabling Act on the scope of the
judicial rulemaking power. See Id. at 2244.
110 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1940).
111 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
112 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015,
1098-1130, 1187 (1982).
The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994), states that except as the
federal constitution, treaties, or statutes otherwise require or provide, "[t] he laws of
the several states.., shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts
of the United States, in cases where they apply."
113 Thus the distinction drawn by the Court between the meaning of FED. R. Civ.
P. 3 in diversity and federal question cases is, in my view, especially baffling. See Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, FederalRules and Common
Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 701-02 (1988). Compare Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (stating that Rule 3 does not control the running of the
statute of limitations in a diversity case), with West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 (1987)
(stating that Rule 3 does control on that issue in a federal question case).
The question of the validity under the REA of the contemporaneous ownership
requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (1) (that in a derivative action, the plaintiff must
have been a shareholder at the time of the wrong complained of) should be the same
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persuasive the arguments of John Ely, that the provision in the REA
limiting rules promulgated pursuant to it to those that do not
"abridge, enlarge or modify' any substantive right carves out of the
Court's authority at least some of Congress's power to legislate in the
"uncertain area" between substance and procedure. 114
Moreover, my view of the appropriate interpretation of the REA
is buttressed by my belief that this interpretation represents a sound
allocation of policymaking responsibility. Many would surely disagree,
and would place more trust in the disinterestedness and/or expertise
of judges, learned academics, and experienced practitioners than in
the inevitably political process of producing (or blocking) legislation.
But I put more emphasis on the role of the elected legislature in effectuating major shifts in substantive rights and liabilities, 115 and am at
the same time more skeptical about the sharpness of the claimed distinction between "non-political" rulemaking and "political" legislative
action or inaction. Thus, even assuming that Congress may delegate
its entire power over rulemaking to the courts-with all the substantive
baggage that would attend such a delegation-I would not favor the
transfer.
Under this view of the REA, Rule 23, as it now stands, raises some
grave questions of validity, and using the rule to compel movement
toward an entity model would be even more problematic. These concerns may be illustrated by indicating some of the problems of
rulemaking presented by the existing rule and some of those
presented by the recently proposed amendments.
At least three examples of questions raised by the existing rule
come to mind. First, as noted above, Rule 23(c) has been interpreted
to require that, at the outset, notice be sent to every class member
whose whereabouts can be identified with reasonable effort.116 Thus
in a federal question case as in a diversity case. For discussion of the REA issue as
applied to this subdivision of the rules, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 94, at 729
n.4, and authorities there cited.
114 SeeJohn Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693, 718-38
(1974). But see Burbank, supranote 112, at 1107-08. As Ely noted, to read the power
delegated to the Supreme Court to be coextensive with congressional power over federal practice and procedure is, in effect, to read the provision quoted in text out of
the statute (except, perhaps, as a statement of emphasis: we mean procedure and not
substance). The evidence mustered by Burbank in opposition to this normal and
useful canon of statutory interpretation-not to read statutory language as surplusage-is, in my view, not compelling.
115 See supra notes 102, 107.
116 See Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); supra text accompanying
notes 58-60. The reading of the notice provision of Rule 23(c) (2) was surely a plausible, if not the most natural one, but as Karen Moore has argued, even a court that
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if one can imagine a class that consists of everyone in the Manhattan
telephone directory and that satisfies every requisite for certification,
the action cannot go forward as a class action without personal notification to every member. Of course, Rule 23 adds nothing of significance if the Constitution always requires such universal notice, but I
doubt that it does.11 7 Thus if the action is a "small claim" class action,
the costs of notice imposed by the rule (and by no other law) may well
be so prohibitive as effectively to deprive the class of its claim. While it
remains theoretically possible for an individual to sue, there is little
practical likelihood that such a suit will be filed, and in any event, if
the entity theory is sound, the entity itself has a claim that it has lost as
a result of the rule.
Second, the rule as now written contains a provision mandating
an opt-out right for individual class members in all cases coming
within the provisions of Rule 23(b) (3).118 Here, in view of the Shutts

decision, 19 perhaps a stronger case can be made for the view that the
provision of the rule adds nothing to existing constitutional requirements. But the relevant language in Shutts is suspect on a variety of
120 it
grounds-for example, it was not truly necessary to the result;
found little or no support in the Court's prior class action jurisprudence;1 21 it contained no justification or even explanation for the conclusion reached; and it may well be limited in any event to cases in
which the members of the class are beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the forum,1 22 so that the constitutional holding would not apply,
adheres to a "plain meaning" approach to the interpretation of statutes, should be
willing to take a less constraining approach to the interpretation of procedural rules
that it has promulgated. See Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,44 HASTINGs L.J. 1039, 1091-1109 (1993).
117 See supra note 61 (regarding the discussion of the Mullane decision).
118 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides that in any class action maintained under
subdivision (b) (3), the notice to each class member shall state that "the court will
exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date."
119 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
120 Since in Shutts itself reasonable notice and opportunity to opt out had been
given to each class member, the Court could have upheld the exercise ofjurisdiction
over class members without deciding whether such notice and opportunity were prerequisites of due process. That question could (and probably should) have been reserved for a case in which the answer would have made a difference.
121 As noted supra text accompanying notes 62-63, the Court's prior class action
jurisprudence had stressed the adequacy of representation as the precondition to the
entry of a judgment binding the class as a whole; notice and the opportunity to opt
out had not been discussed.
122 See CHARLEs
255 (2d ed. 1986).
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for example, in a case in which a nationwide class and nationwide
23
service had been authorized by a federal law.'
If the opt-out right is not constitutionally mandated, and if the
entity model is one dearly validated by the governing substantive law,
would not the substantive interests of the class as a whole be severely
undermined and potentially destroyed if individual members could
opt out at will? Further, might not such action either destroy the integrity of the class or deprive it of some or all of its strongest
members?
Third, consider the requirement of present Rule 23(b) (3) that a
class may be certified under its provisions only if the "questions of law
or fact common to the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members."'1 24 This requirement has generally been
understood (and I think correctly) to override the possibility of certification of a class on particular issues under Rule 23 (c) (4) unless those
issues are found to "predominate" over the individual issues in the
125
case.
Pursuant to this provision, then, class status would have to be denied in a case where, say, there was ample warrant to certify a class on
the question of the defendant's liability-creating conduct toward its
123 In a recent case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider some of the
questions r~ised by Shuttswith respect to the scope of the constitutional "right" to opt
out of a class action, but then dismissed the writ as improvidently granted on the
ground that the federal constitutional issue had not been properly presented to the
state supreme court. See Adams v. Robertson, 117 S.Ct. 1028 (1997).
As this article was being submitted to this Review, two pieces appeared that deal
with the topic discussed in the text and that take a different view of the opt-out issue:
Issacharoff, supra note 2, and Solomon, supranote 2. In the concluding section of her
Note, Solomon states that "[u]ltimately, the constitutionality of mandatory class actions is a choice between pragmatism and individual rights," id. at 1645, and having so
described the conflict, chooses the latter. In the summary of his study, Issacharoff
concludes that a "meaningful right to opt out" accomplishes two objectives: "First of
all, it is a signal to other attorneys that there is a deal in the works and that the deal
may be cooked. Second, it preserves judicial integrity by removing the Star Chamber
aspects of the worst class action practice." Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 833.
124 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (3). This subdivision of the rule also requires that a class
action be "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy." Id.
125 See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745-46 n. 21 (5th Cir.
1996) ("The proper interpretation of the interaction between subdivisions (b) (3) and
(c) (4) is that a cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b) (3)and that (c) (4) is a housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever the
common issues for a class trial ..... Reading rule 23(c) (4) as allowing a court to
sever issues until the remaining common issue predominates over the remaining individual issues would eviscerate the predominance requirement of rule 23(b) (3) ...
(citations omitted); Mullenix, The Mass-Tort Case, supra note 2, at 1038-39.
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members, but the Court was properly persuaded that this question was
not predominant in view of such individual questions as contributory
negligence, express or implied consent, and/or damages. In such a
case, an entity theory of the class action might fairly support a class
claim for a declaratory determination of liability-creating conduct, but
the effect of the rule would be to deprive the class of that claim.
When we turn to the controversial proposals for amendment of
the rule-proposals that, with one exception not relevant here, have
been tabled-several illustrations might be given. 12 6 But perhaps the
most striking illustration arose from the effort of the proposed
amendment to discourage class actions when the claims of individual
class members were small and the problems of litigation were large.
Assuming this proposal was not merely hortatory but was designed to
have bite, would not the effect of its adoption have been to deny the
very existence of a class with a "small claim," whether or not that claim
was one properly belonging to the class as a matter of substantive law?
Once again, if the entity theory has any basis, to say that a claim may
nevertheless still be asserted by individual members of the class is both
practically of little or no value and irrelevant to the denial of the class
claim itself.
It may be that these arguments are overstated. After all, one who
has a just claim may find himself out of court because without the
discovery that is unavailable unless a claim is filed, he cannot make
the allegations required by the pleading requirements, say, of Rule
9 (b). But my response would be that any provision of a rule that does
more than instruct litigants about how to go about asserting and prosecuting claims and defenses (and all the incidents of doing so) and
that raises significant barriers to their assertion must be carefully vetted under the REA. It may be that the rule is so clearly warranted by
the need to run a judicial system efficiently and fairly, and the effect
on the assertion of ajust claim under the governing substantive law so
126 One of these proposed changes would have added to the relevant factors to be
considered under Rule 23(b) (3) the "maturity" of any related litigation, See 167 F.IRD.
523, 559 (1996). This is a cryptic change described in the Advisory Committee Note
as
reflect[ing] the need to support class adjudication by experience gained in
completed litigation of several individual claims. If the results of individual
litigation begin to converge, class adjudication may seem appropriate . . . [but not if] individual litigation continues to yield inconsistent results, or... demonstrates that knowledge has not yet advanced far enough
to support confident decision on a class basis.
Id. at 562-63.
For criticism of this "maturity" concept, see supra text accompanying notes
53-56.
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marginal, that the rule should pass muster under even the close scrutiny that I would favor. But if not, it may have no place in a set of rules
promulgated under the power granted by Congress.
Even if this view of the REA is too confining to be accepted by the
courts themselves or by those who monitor them as observers or litigators, it can perhaps set the stage for a closer look at the proper role
of Rule 23 (and its parallels in those states whose rules are judicially
promulgated). For even one who takes a broader view than I do of
the scope of the judicial rulemaking power should, I believe, balk at
the use of that power either to endorse or to reject the entity theory
advanced here.
What, then, is the contribution that a provision like Rule 23 can
make? In my view, the rule should be framed in a way that does not
place unreasonable roadblocks in the way of movement toward an entity model by responsible policymakers, nor should it impede recognition of the present force and effect of the model in the administration
of class actions. At present, the rule may well fail both of these
criteria.
Several examples, some of which have been flagged in the preceding sections, may illustrate the point. First, the present rule, as
interpreted, sets up a barrier to a small claims class action-the barrier of excessively costly and unnecessary notification-that effectively
negates the recognition of a class claim in such cases whether or not
such a claim is properly one attributable to the class as an entity and
deserves recognition as a matter of substantive law. Also, the proposal
to deny class status to such claims when individual stakes seem too
small to be worth the cost of litigating went even further in denying
the availability of a class claim on what is essentially an irrelevant basis
if the entity theory has bite, i.e., that no individual member of the
class would be likely to pursue the claim on his own.
Second, as noted above, the rule's present treatment of opt-out
rights-prohibiting them in actions under (b) (1) and (b) (2) and requiring them in 'actions under (b) (3)-seems at odds with the concept of an entity model. If the model is a sound one in a (b) (3)
setting, then recognition of an absolute opt-out right in that context
would undermine the validity of class treatment itself.' 27 On the
other hand, a conditional or limited ability to opt out as part of a

127 Also, the likelihood that a significant percentage would choose to opt out may
be an indication that class treatment is not appropriate.
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litigated or negotiated outcome may be consistent with class treatment
128
of a claim or issue.
In (b) (1) or (b) (2) cases, conditional or limited opt out rights
may also make sense in the context of a negotiated or litigated outcome, although the nature of these actions makes this possibility less
likely. (Indeed, opting out in many such cases may be pointless as a
practical matter. 129 ) Take, say, a case in which an injunction is
sought, on behalf of a class of shippers, against a particular practice by
a carrier. If some of the shippers in the class would prefer to have the
practice continued as to them, the class might be defined at the outset
to exclude those shippers, but it might also be appropriate for the
action to go forward with them as a part of the class (in order to postpone decision until further information is acquired), and then to allow shippers who so desire to escape some or all of the "benefits" of
130
the decree ultimately awarded or agreed upon.
As a final point about present Rule 23, it seems unnecessary to
bar class certification on particular issues under Rule 23(c) (4) unless
there is a prior determination under 23(b) (3) that class claims
predominate over the individual aspects of the case. Suppose in a
"mass toxic tort" case, the only question suitable for class treatment, in
view of the widely varied individual facts about exposure, possible
causes of particular harms, and other factors, is whether exposure to a
particular product increases the risk of incurring a particular disease.
If the answer to that question is no, all other questions cease to be of
significance, and the certification of that question for full-blown, non
opt-out class treatment may be the fairest and most efficient way to
deal with it. But that approach would be unavailable under the present rule if that issue did not predominate over the questions of individual exposure and harm.
All these concerns suggest that Rule 23 should be revised to facilitate return to the fundamental point developed by the Supreme Court
over half a century ago-that the constitutional propriety of class action treatment, and the binding effect of ajudgment on the members
128 Rosenberg, Class Actions, supranote 2, at 594, suggests that the ability to opt out
might be subject to such conditions as specified limits on the lawyer's fee paid to one
who opts out and a requirement that the individual make some contribution to the
common costs incurred by the class in litigating (and negotiating) with respect to the
claim. Other possible conditions might include caps on recovery and limits on punitive damage awards.
129 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
130 I am assuming that the practice may be discontinued as to some but not as to
others, both as a practical matter and consistently with the controlling law.
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of the class, turns on the issue of adequate representation. 1 3 ' If that

point were to become the heart of a recrafted rule, facilitation of the
use of the class action as a fair and powerful litigating device would be
greatly enhanced. To do so, I believe, calls for a number of steps,
many if not all of which could be recognized in the rule itself. These
include:
" Focusing on the adequacy of counsel (rather than worrying
about the named representative);
" Recognizing that adequacy requires consideration not only of
counsel's experience and ability but also of the potential existence of conflicts either within the represented group or between that group and outsiders also represented by the same
32
counsel;
" Making sure that counsel remains responsible to the class as a
whole by establishing channels of communication with a sufficiently representative group of class members and by allowing
that group to be heard at critical stages of the process in order
to be sure that the class is not being manipulated either by
counsel or by the adversary;
" Developing explicit techniques to explore both the fairness of
settlements in overall terms and in terms of distributions to be
made among class members, as well as techniques to insure
33
against disproportionate counsel fees.'
131 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
132 Among the leading scholarly studies of the range of conflicts problems that
can be presented when counsel represents a diverse, largely anonymous class with
potentially conflicting interests (interests that many class members may not even be
aware of), or represents both the class and individuals within or outside the class, are
Coffee, supra note 2; Koniak, supra note 2; and Rhode, supra note 2. The danger of
such conflicts requires close judicial scrutiny and continual judicial oversight, and
may also require the appointment by the Court of additional counsel to safeguard
class interests and to alert the court to the possibility of collusive settlements.
For a novel approach to the representation problem, involving the auctioning of
a class claim for compensation to the highest bidder, see Macey & Miller, supra note 2
(discussed infra note 133).
133 For a suggested checklist of issues to be considered in deciding whether to
approve a settlement, see Schwarzer, supra note 2, at 843-44.
One of the most interesting, and promising, studies in this area is Hay, supra note
2. Hay argues persuasively, both through analysis and illustration, that the likelihood
of inappropriately low settlements, which benefit counsel unduly at the expense of
the class, may be very substantially reduced by adoption of the following rule: that the
net fee to class counsel resulting from the settlement should be no greater than the
fraction of the class recovery that counsel would have collected as a fee if the case had
not been settled but rather had been litigated. This approach is designed to ensure
that the net recovery to the class in a settlement is at least as large as the net recovery
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To insure adequate representation, as this partial list suggests, requires not only a concentrated focus on counsel for the class but also
an explicit and detailed elaboration of the role of the court in seeing
that counsel does her job of representing the class fairly and effectively. Indeed, on some occasions, this may require the employment
by the court itself of separate counsel to oversee, to challenge, and to
advise.'

3 4

IV.

CONCLUSION

The reader of this essay may view the ideas advanced here as constituting a radical departure from traditional notions or, at the other
extreme, as just a rehashing of developments that have long been in
the making. My own view is a blend of these polar reactions. For
some time, we have been moving-both out of necessity and out of a
sense of what is sound policy-toward the idea that the class action
device is both important and different. But we have not been fully
candid with ourselves. Some judges and commentators have at times
insisted that we are dealing with nothing more than another aggregation technique in which the individual should (or even must) retain
full autonomy and freedom of choice. Others have urged a kind of
in the absence of settlement. Although it may require the court to estimate the net
recovery to the class in the absence of settlement, Hay shows that even a substantial
error in that estimate will lead to a much smaller gap between the appropriate settlement figure and the actual net recovery in the absence of a settlement.
If Hay's thesis is sound and is implemented, many of the criticisms of class actions
that are based on the hazard that class counsel will profit at the class's expense will be
severely blunted.

A more radical proposal that has attracted scholarly interest (and, in my view,
deservedly so), but as a practical matter is unlikely to be implemented, is to facilitate
the auctioning of certain class claims to the highest bidder, with the proceeds of the
auction to be distributed among the members of the class. See Macey & Miller, supra
note 2, at 106-16. The winning bidder would then be sole owner of the entire claim,
thus eliminating any problems of conflicts within the class, and if the winning bidder
were herself counsel in the case, eliminating any potential conflict between lawyer
and client. Of course, adoption of any proposal of this kind would require virtual
abandonment of some traditional notions of professional ethics relating to such practices as barratry and maintenance.
134 Other proposals for explicit requirements designed to insure adequate representation-including, for example, the kinds of disclosures that must be made in any
settlement agreement submitted for approval-are worthy of joint consideration by
practitioners, judges, experts on procedure and legal ethics, and informed, concerned lay.
For a recent update on current studies of mass tort litigation by both the House
Judiciary Committee and a working group appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist, see
66 U.S.L.W. 2550, 2551 (1998).
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entity model while insisting that it is fully consistent with traditional
notions of individual choice.
I am concerned that both of these viewpoints may make it more
difficult for the class action to realize its full potential. If we can accept the notion that in a proper context, the class itself is-or at least
should be-the claimant, and the represented litigant, we will be in a
far better position to talk about the changes that are needed to realize
this goal, and the institutional problems that must be confronted in
attempting to implement those changes.
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